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Abstract  
 
The aim of the following study is to analyse the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into 
the Energy Community using the theoretical framework of liberal intergovernmentalism. 
The main focus is on cooperation with regard to gas energy security and the theoretical 
framework of liberal intergovernmentalism is applied to analyse the economic and 
geopolitical motivations for cooperating on energy as a mean to ensure the gas transit 
dimension of EU energy security on the one side and as a mean to solve the energy 
security challenges related to gas for Ukraine and Moldova on the other.  
 
The study reveals that the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community 
entail asymmetrical costs and benefits for the EU and Ukraine and Moldova as well as 
entails both costs and benefits for all parties. The mix of benefits and opportunities means 
that bilateral bargaining and not the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy 
Community should be expected and it is on this background concluded that liberal 
intergovernmentalism is not fully capable of explaining the integration of Ukraine and 
Moldova into the Energy Community. Despite this, the use of liberal intergovernmentalism 
has led to several important findings of which together has made it clear that the 
integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community does not ensure the 
transit dimension of EU energy security. This is the case as the asymmetries in the 
preferences of cooperation on gas within the framework of the Treaty can be found to 
explain the lack of implementation of the obligations of Ukraine as they according to the 
theory reduce the economic and geopolitical interests of Ukraine of implementing the 
obligations of the Treaty. In addition to this, the use of the theory has highlighted the risk 
of Ukraine and Moldova giving up their membership of the Energy Community due to the 
disagreement with Russia over the Third Package. As the transit dimension of EU energy 
security was found to depend on increasing the transparency and infrastructure of the 
Ukrainian and Moldovan gas sectors as well as on the ability of the EU to more closely 
monitor the gas trade between Ukraine and Moldova and Russia, with the use of liberal 
intergovernmentalism it can be concluded, that the integration of Ukraine and Moldova 
into the Energy Community do not ensure the transit dimension of EU energy security.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Contrary to oil, the intensity of natural gas has risen the last thirty years and Europeans 
today use more gas per unit of GDP than thirty years ago. While Europe shares the 
growing gas intensity with the industrialized countries of Asia, its absolute share per unit 
of GDP is almost three times as high (Keppler 2007: 15). Moreover, whilst oil is traded 
globally and moved round widely, the global trade of gas relies on pipelines crossing 
several countries. The Russian state-controlled gas producer Gazprom is the world 
largest exporter of gas and also the most important supplier of the commodity for Europe, 
accounting for 34 per cent of the natural gas imports in Europe (Blas 2012 and Ratner et 
al 2012: 1-9). The dependency of the EU on gas imports from Russia is expected to 
increase from 168 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2007 to as much as 250 bcm by the year 
of 2020 (Yegorov & Wirl 2009: 147 and European Commission 2000/769). The intensity of 
natural gas as well as the dependency on Russia makes the supply of gas a key security 
concern for the EU (EU Security Strategy 2003: 2). According to the President of the 
European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, this will make energy policy to define the politics 
of the 21st century. Knowing that energy could become a really scarce good in the 
growing world economy, the battle for energy may according to Rompuy become a matter 
of survival, and of war and peace (European Files 2011: 6). 
 
Because of the transport of gas is dependent on pipeline infrastructure, the EU 
neighbourhood is of importance for the transportation of gas. Russian gas exports to 
Europe flow through Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, but fragile and sometimes hostile 
relations between Kyiv, Minsk, Moscow and Chisinau have in the past resulted in 
interruptions in the flow of gas to Europe. Some countries in the Eastern Europe, which in 
some cases are almost exclusively reliant on Russian gas imports, have been particular 
vulnerable to these interruptions. The most severe interruptions took place in 2006 and 
2009 when Gazprom temporarily suspended the gas supply to Ukraine as a consequence 
of the failure of agreeing on the price of gas (Ratner et al 2012: 5 and Pirani 2009:170-
174). Though the price dispute between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 did not directly 
involve Europe, the decision by Gazprom to temporarily suspend the gas supply to 
Ukraine also interrupted the supply of gas to a number of European countries and within 
hours of the shut off of the gas to Ukraine, several member states of the EU reported 
drops in their pipeline pressure (Belkin & Mellini 2007: 4-5). The fall in volumes caused an 
outcry all over Europe (Stern 2006: 9). In 2009 the situation was repeated when Russia 
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and Ukraine once again failed to agree on a price on gas. The crisis was by far the most 
serious of its kind as all Russian gas exports was cut off on 1 January. As a consequence, 
exports to 16 member states of the EU were drastically reduced on 6 January and 
completely from 17 January. The most serious affected countries in Europe were the 
countries of the Balkans, which experienced a humanitarian emergency, with parts of the 
population unable to heat their homes. In Hungary and Slovakia the disputes lead to 
significant economic problems, but not of a humanitarian kind.  Deliveries to Ukraine and 
other European countries were restarted on 20 January (Stern 2009: 4).  
 
The gas crises between Ukraine and Russia in 2006 and 2009 have focused the attention 
of the EU on the dependence of Europe on gas imports from Russia as well as the 
importance of establishing stable neighbourhood relations in order to avoid more cut offs. 
Specifically, the gas disputes have elevated transit security to the top of EU energy 
security thinking, demonstrating the importance and ultimate failure of all existing 
instruments in ensuring the transit dimension of EU energy security (Motyl 2006: 3 and 
Yafimava 2011: 1).  
 
1.1 The Energy Community Treaty 
In the aftermath of the energy crises in 2006 and 2009 the EU has worked hard to get the 
neighbouring transit countries of Moldova and Ukraine to sign the Energy Community 
Treaty (Treaty) and ultimately join the Energy Community in order to provide the EU with a 
higher leverage over their territories. The reason is that this is assumed to provide a 
greater security of the transit across the territory of these neighbours of the EU (Yafimava 
2011: 50-51). As a result, on 1 May 2010 and on 1 February 2011 Moldova and Ukraine 
respectively became the most recent countries to join the Energy Community. Whilst 
Belarus is also vital for the energy security of the EU and specifically gas transit security, 
Belarus has not expressed any desire to become a member of the Energy Community 
(Yafimava 2011: 50-51).  
 
The Treaty is an intergovernmental agreement between the EU and its neighbours and 
was signed in October 2005 by the EU on behalf of the member states of the EU on the 
one side and Albania, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Romania, Serbia and the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo on the other 
(Yafimava 2011: 50). The objectives of the Energy Community are first of all to create a 
stable legal and market framework capable of attracting investment in order to ensure a 
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stable and continuous energy supply to the EU. Moreover, the Treaty envisages creating 
a single regulatory space for trade in network energy, to enhance security of supply in this 
space, to develop cross-border relations and to improve energy efficiency and the 
environmental situation related to network energy and develop network energy market 
competition (Council 2006/500 EC). In order to reach these objectives, the Treaty requires 
the participants to adopt the energy acquis of the EU. This is a list of EC directives in the 
areas of electricity, gas, environment and renewable energy. Additionally, the participants 
are required to follow EU competition law (Prange-Gstöhl 2009: 5299). With regard to gas 
this specifically means liberalizing the gas market by the adoption the European 
Community Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas (Council 
2006/500 EC: Annex 1). 
 
1.2 Analysing the potential of the Energy Community Treaty 
As the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community is intended to 
ensure the transit dimension of EU energy security, an analysis of the integration of 
Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community is highly relevant. The following study 
suggests applying an international political economic approach to the study of this as the 
integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community raises interesting political 
economy issues such as the main economic and geopolitical interests at stake on both the 
EU and the Ukrainian and Moldovan sides and the main economic and geopolitical 
challenges in the integration process. The political economy approach of liberal 
intergovernmentalism will be used as this allows for a combination of an analysis of the 
national preferences for energy cooperation within the framework of the Treaty of both the 
EU and Ukraine and Moldova as well as an analysis of the process of interstate 
bargaining and implementation of the obligations of the Treaty.  
 
1.3 Aim of study 
The aim of the following study is to analyse the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into 
the Energy Community using the theoretical framework of liberal intergovernmentalism. 
The main focus is on cooperation with regard to gas energy security and the theoretical 
framework of liberal intergovernmentalism will be applied to analyse the economic and 
geopolitical motivations for cooperating on gas as a mean to ensure the gas transit 
dimension of energy security for the EU on the one side and as a mean to solve the 
energy security challenges related to gas for Ukraine and Moldova on the other. This 
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allows for an analysis of the domestic political and economic benefits of energy 
cooperation for the EU and Ukraine and Moldova whilst at the same time allows for an 
intergovernmental analysis of the bargaining and implementation of the obligations of the 
Treaty. When relevant alternative theoretical and empirical explanations will be included 
and reflected upon in order to decide on the explanatory power of the theory of liberal 
intergovernmentalism.  
 
1.4 Research question 
How can the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community be explained 
using the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism?  
 
1.5. Guiding questions 
The following guiding questions are related to structure the study and illustrate the path 
through which the research question will be answered.  
 
1. How does the trade of gas create a relationship of interdependence between the EU 
and Ukraine and Moldova? 
2. How can the national preferences for gas cooperation of the EU and Ukraine and 
Moldova within the framework of the Treaty be explained? 
3. How have the different national preferences for gas cooperation within the framework 
of the Treaty affected the interstate bargaining and implementation of the obligations 
of the Treaty for Ukraine and Moldova? 
4. What are the main challenges in the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the 
Energy Community? 
5. To what degree does the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy 
Community ensure the transit dimension of EU energy security? 
 
1.6 Structure of thesis 
In the chapter following this introduction, the methodological and theoretical 
considerations related to answering the research question are introduced. Following this, 
the theoretical framework of liberal intergovernmentalism is introduced and 
operationalized in chapter three. Chapter four regards the transit dimension of EU energy 
security and chapter five the energy security challenges related to gas for Ukraine and 
Moldova. For both chapters applies that the energy security interests are established with 
regard to geopolitical and economic variables. The preferences of energy security are in 
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chapter six analysed with regard to the economic and geopolitical costs and benefits of 
cooperating on energy within the Energy Community for the EU and Ukraine and 
Moldova. It will be evident that the interests of cooperating on energy within the Energy 
Community are much different for the EU on the one side and Ukraine and Moldova on 
the other. This will show to be of great importance in the analysis of the bargaining and 
implementation of the obligations of the Treaty. The process of the bargaining and 
implementation of the Treaty is in chapter seven established. This allows for the analysis 
of the bargaining and implementation of the obligations of the Treaty and thus the 
answering of the research question. This takes place in chapter eight. The conclusion 
follows in chapter nine and the perspectives in chapter ten. This last chapter takes the 
criticism of liberal intergovernmentalism into account, discussing the conclusions of the 
study in the light of the criticism of the methodology, theory as well as disputes of the 
specific claim of European integration by Moravcsik. 
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2. Methodological and theoretical considerations 
 
In the following it is clarified how the research question is answered. The chapter is 
organized as to introduce to the comparative case study method of the study first. 
Following this, the decision to choose the theoretical framework of liberal 
intergovernmentalism is introduced, the application of the theory to the analysis of the 
Treaty as well as the critique and limitations of the theory. The analytical strategy and the 
definition of energy security follow. The time period is lastly introduced.  
 
2.1 A comparative case study method 
The following study uses a comparative case study to answer the research question first 
of all because one according to Robert Yin should use a case study method when 
deliberately interested in covering contextual conditions, believing that these might be 
highly important to the study (Yin 2003: 13). This is the case with regard to this study due 
to the use of liberal intergovernmentalism as a theoretical framework as using this first 
and foremost entails analysing the domestic preferences of cooperating on energy within 
the framework of the Treaty for the EU and Ukraine and Moldova. The reason is that 
domestic preferences are believed to be decisive for the formation of state preferences 
and with this also decisive for the outcome of interstate bargaining. Moreover, as the 
research question is explanatory the case study is suitable as a research method. The 
reason is that how and why research questions according to Yin are more explanatory 
than for example what or who questions and therefore deal with operational links needing 
to be traced over time of which the case study deals with. In contrast, what or who 
questions deal more with frequencies or incidences (Yin 2003: 6).  
 
Turning to the research design of case studies, the research design is according to Yin 
the logic that links the data to be collected to the initial questions of the study and hence 
ultimately to the conclusions to be drawn. The research design includes the collection and 
analysis of relevant data and is by Yin defined in five different components (Yin 2003: 19) 
 
1. The research question  
2. Its propositions  
3. It units of analysis  
4. The logic linking the data to the propositions  
5. The criteria for interpreting the findings  
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Applying the components to the following study, the research question enables an 
analysis of the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community using the 
theory of liberal intergovernmentalism. This allows for the answering of the propositions 
which all are intended to examine different elements of the research question. Specifically, 
the propositions shed light on how the trade of gas creates a relationship of 
interdependence between the EU and Ukraine and Moldova, how the national preferences 
for gas cooperation can be explained, how these have affected the interstate bargaining 
and implementation of the obligations of the Treaty, the main challenges in the integration 
process as well as to what degree the integration of Ukraine and Moldova ensure the 
transit dimension of EU energy security. With regard to the units of the analysis, this is 
according to Yin related to the definition of what the case is (Yin 2003: 22-26). The unit of 
analysis of this study is the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy 
Community. Due to the choice of theory this involves economic and geopolitical 
motivations for cooperation on gas within the framework of the Treaty as well as the 
bargaining and implementation of the obligations of the Treaty with regard to gas, confer 
chapter 3. Turning to the components of the logic linking the data to the propositions and 
the criteria for interpreting the findings, these are according to Yin closely related to the 
other components (Yin 2003: 28). Therefore, in order to treat the evidence fairly, produce 
compelling analytic conclusions and rule out alternative interpretations an analytical 
strategy is important (Yin 2003: 111). The analytical strategy of this study is established in 
section 2.6.  
 
2.2 Deciding on a liberal intergovernmentalist framework 
The theory of liberal intergovernmentalism is in the following study used as a theoretical 
framework for answering the research question. This is first of all the case because gas 
energy security by the EU is identified as among the key security concerns of the EU (EU 
Security Strategy 2003: 2). Security is a multifaceted concept and whilst large scale 
violent conflict is the concern that traditionally receives the most attention from 
policymakers, alternative risks to the ensuring and maintenance of national security and 
alternative referent objectives are increasingly being considered (Borbica et al 2007: 51). 
This is indeed the case in the EU as energy issues by the President of the Council 
Herman Van Rompuy are identified as may become a matter of survival, and of war and 
peace (European Files 2011: 6). The survival of the state is a central element of theories 
of international relations of which liberal intergovernmentalism is based on. International 
relations theories can be divided into a realist and a liberal school as the two theories 
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differ in whether it is state capabilities or preferences that determine states behaviour. 
Liberal intergovernmentalism falls within the liberal school as it holds that state 
preferences rather than international concerns are the primary determinants of state 
behaviour. Herein a central element of liberal intergovernmentalism is the claim that 
economic interdependence between countries introduces economic and geopolitical 
incentives for multilateralism, confer section 3.1 and 3.3. This claim is important in the 
choice of liberal intergovernmentalism as a theoretical framework for this study as the 
pipeline gas trade indeed interlocks Russia, the EU and Ukraine and Moldova into a long-
term relationship of high interdependence confer section 3.3.4. This interdependence is 
both of economic and of geopolitical importance as a safe, secure, sustainable and 
affordable energy supply is the key to the economic stability of the EU member states as 
well as the strategic interest of the EU as a global player (European Files 2011: 14). 
Altogether, this makes liberal intergovernmentalism as a theoretical framework with roots 
in international relations theories well suited for the analysis of the cooperation on gas 
within the framework of the Treaty.  
 
Lastly, whilst Moravcsik utilizes liberal intergovernmentalism to analyse and explain the 
level of integration between the EU and the member states of the EU, the theory is also 
suitable for the analysis of EU agreements with third countries since both association 
agreements and accession to the EU requite unanimity among member states and 
therefore may fit into the category of interstate bargaining (Montanari 2005: 5). Adopting 
this argument, it is valid to analyse the integration of Moldova and Ukraine into the Energy 
Community as its application may only be extended either for all parties by unanimous 
decision in the Ministerial Council or for the parties who vote for extension. For the latter is 
regards only as long as they numbers at least two thirds of the number of European 
Community members (Council Decision 2006/500 EC: Article 82 and 83).   
 
2.3 Critique of liberal intergovernmentalism 
The critique of liberal intergovernmentalism is wide in scope and regards the theoretical 
framework, the specific methodology as well as the claim of Moravcsik of explaining the 
major steps towards European integration. Starting with the theoretical and 
methodological criticism this on the one side regards the interpretation and explanation of 
individual state preferences, politics and particular stages of European integration as well 
on the positivistic and rational methodology of the theory of Moravcsik (Schimmelfennig 
2004: 81-82). This kind of criticism is more on the specific approach to the study of 
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European integration instead of the specific theory of Moravcsik and may thus ascertain 
that politics and economics cannot be separated or that economic interests do not guide 
integration. Such an approach is for example the constructivist approach in which it is 
argued that EU integration is better understood by applying constructivism in which 
deliberation, discourses, norms, persuasion, socialization and identity are more 
fundamental concepts. Another critique regards the claim by Moravcsik of explaining the 
major steps towards European integration. A range of critics dispute this claim and argue 
that liberal intergovernmentalist analyses of the big decisions of the EU are inadequate. 
One critique in this regard goes on that the selection of cases may appear biased, even if 
one accepts that liberal intergovernmentalism is a theory of constitutional change rather 
than day-to-day policy-making. Moreover, even within a rationalist perspective, the 
tripartite framework of liberal intergovernmentalism and its specific hypotheses may be 
disputed. By instance, the analytical question of separation of bargaining and institutional 
choice is according to critics questionable as there strong linkages between the two. 
Meanwhile, the most fundamental critique of using liberal intergovernmentalism to explain 
major integration decisions are lead forward by proponents of supranational or historical 
institutionalism. According to these scholars, liberal intergovernmentalism is well suited to 
account for the initial grand bargaining and the original choice of institutions, however in 
subsequent round of negotiations the preferences of the governments may change and 
will be constrained by unanticipated or undesired consequences of their previous 
decisions. In particular, supranational institutions will work to enhance their own autonomy 
(Schimmelfennig 2004: 82).   
 
Taking this criticism of liberal intergovernmentalism into account, it is evident that liberal 
intergovernmentalism has a range of critics, disputing all parts of the methodology and 
integration claims. In order to incorporate this criticism into this study, alternative 
interpretations will be discussed when the theory is not capable of explaining the 
analytical observations. Moreover, the conclusions of the study are in chapter ten 
discussed to the criticism. Meanwhile, despite the critique liberal intergovernmentalism will 
still be considered most suitable for the analysis of the integration of Ukraine and Moldova 
into the Energy Community. This is the case as integration of Ukraine and Moldova can 
be considered as a mean of the EU to enhance its security and thus the survival of its 
member states as well as due to the relationship of interdependence related to the trade 
of gas. This interdependence is both of economic and of geopolitical importance for the 
EU due to a safe, secure, sustainable and affordable energy supply is identified as the key 
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to the economic stability of the EU member states as well as the strategic interest of the 
EU as a global player, confer section 2.2. This makes liberal intergovernmentalism well 
suited to the analysis of the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy 
Community. 
 
2.4 Theoretical and empirical limitations 
In adopting liberal intergovernmentalism to the study of the Treaty with Ukraine and 
Moldova a number of limitations have been necessary. First of all, the interests of 
domestic constituents as part of the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism will not be 
included in the analysis of the domestic interests of the EU and Ukraine and Moldova in 
regard of cooperating on gas within the framework of the Treaty. Though this is a 
limitation, it is not contrary to liberal intergovernmentalism as the choices made by 
national leaders in liberal intergovernmentalist terms are assumed to be based by the 
economic interests of domestic constituents, meaning that the choices made by national 
leaders in liberal intergovernmental terms also will represent the main domestic 
constituents (Moravcsik 1998: 18). Another limitation regards that the EU in the following 
study will be perceived as one actor and the differences in concerns over and options 
available to different EU member states in regard to energy security due to diverging 
energy situations, interests, demands and the various distinct webs of relations between 
the individual member states and the energy exporting countries (Kusku 2010: 145) will 
not be included. Though this is a limitation of the study, it is also not contrary to liberal 
intergovernmentalism as Moravcsik argues that that cooperation is only possible among 
sovereign states as long as their interests converge (Moravcsik 1993: 487). However, it is 
beyond question that there are differences in the concerns. For information of the different 
opinions and options available to the different EU member states see Kusku 2010.  
  
Moreover, by deciding on a political economic approach to the answering of the research 
question, the theoretical framework is focused on the economic and geopolitical costs and 
benefits of cooperating on energy as a mean to solve the energy security challenges for 
the EU and Ukraine and Moldova. Specifically, this means that other variables which are 
not related to the economic and political costs and benefits of cooperating on energy as a 
mean to solve the energy security challenges for the EU and Ukraine and Moldova is only 
included as alternative explanations and not part of the theoretical framework. Specifically, 
the incentives of Ukraine and Moldova of EU membership and the incentives of Ukraine 
and the EU of balancing the international power of Russia are included as alternative 
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explanations. This is of importance in order to decide on the explanatory power of the 
theory.  
 
Turning to the empirical limitations, energy security is in the following study to be 
conceived with regard to gas and energy security with regard to other energy resources is 
thus not included in the following study. The limitations stems from the narrow focus of the 
transit dimension of EU energy security which regards the transit of gas. However, as the 
Treaty also involves energy cooperation with regard to energy in general and not only gas, 
the motivations for cooperation on energy within the Treaty may also regard other energy 
resources such as oil and electricity for the EU and Ukraine and Moldova. Though the 
study aims to focus solely on the geopolitical and economic motivations for energy 
cooperation within the Treaty with regard to gas it is impossible to fully distinguish the 
motivations. Therefore, where for example the cooperation cannot be explained with 
regard to the established motivations regarding gas, cooperation with regard to other 
energy resources will be included.   
 
2.5 Analytical strategy 
The analytical strategy of the following study is closely linked to the theory of liberal 
intergovernmentalism as the theory entails several stages of analysis of which entails 
using different theories. Two theories are used in this study: A liberal theory of national 
preference formation and an intergovernmentalist theory of interstate negotiations. On this 
background, the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community will first 
be explained by analysing the preferences of energy security with regard to gas for the EU 
and Ukraine and Moldova. This is analysed in chapter six and provides the first level of 
analysis of the study. The second level of analysis regards the interstate bargaining and 
implementation of the obligations of the Treaty. This is analysed in chapter eight. In both 
levels alternative theoretical as well as empirical explanations of the integration of Ukraine 
and Moldova will be included in order to decide on the explanatory power of the theory of 
liberal intergovernmentalism.  
 
2.6 Definition of energy security  
The definition of energy security can only be operational when it is formulated for and 
applied to a specific energy source or a country and in order to answer the research 
question it is thus of importance to define what precisely is meant when the term is used. 
First of all, the following study only concerns energy security with regard to natural gas. 
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Though energy security with regard to oil or for example electricity may also be of 
importance to the energy security of the EU and Ukraine and Moldova, these other 
commodities will not be included. With this established, it is further necessary to introduce 
to what specifically energy security entails for both the EU and Ukraine and Moldova as 
energy security necessarily means different things for either party. This is established in 
chapter four and five in which it will become evident that energy security related to gas 
means much different things to the EU than for Ukraine and Moldova. This will in chapter 
eight prove to be a main reason to why the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism is not 
capable of explaining the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community. 
Summarizing the findings of chapter four and five, energy security for the EU is linked to 
the security of gas supply. This can for the EU be defined as the acceptable level of threat 
of supply and price disruptions, which may arise in the transit part of the gas supply chain. 
In contrast, the energy security interests of Moldova and Ukraine are linked to future 
essential energy needs can be met. This is both by means of adequate domestic 
resources worked under economically acceptable conditions or maintained as strategic 
reserves.  
 
2.7 Time period 
The central point in time of the following study is the bargaining, signing and 
implementation of the obligations of the Treaty between the EU and Moldova and Ukraine. 
Specifically, the time period runs from November 2008 to April 2012 as the negotiations 
for the signing of the Treaty began in 2008 whilst the implementation of the obligations of 
the Treaty most lately has proven difficult in April 2012. The later refers specifically to the 
conflict between Ukraine and the Energy Community over the South Stream in April 2012. 
Meanwhile, the period also covers the signing of the Third Package of the Energy 
Community Treaty in October 2011 and the energy security problems for Moldova and 
Ukraine arising from their obligation to implement this. In order to analyse the bargaining, 
signing and implementation of the obligations of the Treaty the costs and benefits of 
cooperating on energy within the Treaty is established for the EU on the one side and 
Ukraine and Moldova on the other. This naturally entails background information of the 
energy relationship between the EU and Ukraine and Moldova and the impact of the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union to the economic and political situation in Moldova and 
Ukraine. Thus, when necessary the time period is extended in order to provide information 
on the energy security challenges of the EU and Ukraine and Moldova at the time of the 
bargaining and implementation of the Treaty was started. However, as the bargaining and 
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implementation of the Treaty take place through a four year period as well as future 
energy security challenges will prove to be essential to the bargaining and implementation 
of the Treaty, the establishment of the interests of cooperating on gas will also be 
expanded to entail information beyond November 2008 when relevant.  
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3. Liberal intergovernmentalism 
 
In the following the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism is introduced as it provides the 
theoretical framework for answering the research question of the following study. The 
chapter begins with an introduction to the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism. Hereafter 
the rationality assumption and the theory of national preferences are established. The 
introduction to the theory of national preferences includes the preferences for 
supranational cooperation as well as economic and geopolitical preferences, of which the 
latter two are the main variables of this study. With this established, the link between 
economic and geopolitical preferences of supranational cooperation with regard to gas 
cooperation is introduced. The liberal intergovernmentalist theory of interstate bargaining 
finishes off the chapter.  
 
3.1 Introduction to the theory 
Liberal intergovernmentalism is a model of preference formation and international 
bargaining by Andrew Moravcsik. The theory draws on liberal theories of international 
relations, international political economy, regime theory and international bargaining 
(Pollack 2001: 225 and Moravcsik 1993: 480-481). At the very core of the theory is the 
assumption of national preferences being domestically generated and not derived from 
international security concerns as well as the assumption of the bargaining power of 
states being determined by the relative intensity of preferences and not by military or other 
material power capabilities (Pollack 2001: 226). Thus, liberal intergovernmentalism plays 
down the impact of international politics and systematic change on the formation of 
domestic interests. Thereby, liberal intergovernmentalism affirms the principle source of 
integration lies in the states themselves (Ginsberg 1999: 441). This does not mean that 
liberal intergovernmentalism is not concerned with security threats. However, where 
realists attribute the sources of security threats to particular configuration of power, liberal 
theories attribute them to extreme conflict among ideological, institutional and material 
preferences (Moravcsik 2010: 15). 
 
According to Moravcsik the EU can be analysed as a successful intergovernmental 
regime designed to manage economic interdependence through negotiated policy co-
ordination (Moravcsik 1993: 474). This means that the substantive and institutional 
development of the EU may be explained through the sequential analysis of national 
preference formation and intergovernmental strategic interaction (Moravcsik 1993: 480). 
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Therefore, when refined and extended, existing theories of foreign economic policy, 
intergovernmental negotiation and international regimes provide a plausible and 
generalizable explanation of the evolution of the EU (Moravcsik 1993: 474). With regard to 
the unit of analysis of this study this means that existing theories of national preference 
formation and intergovernmental strategic interaction can when refined be used to explain 
the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community as this shed light on 
the institutional development of the Energy Community.   
 
In the following liberal intergovernmentalism is further introduced. Because of the 
limitations of this study, the theoretical considerations by Moravcsik on the interests of 
domestic constituents and the two-level bargaining of the EU is only shortly introduced as 
these elements are not included in the following study. For the methodological 
considerations on this, see section 2.4.  
 
3.2 The rationality assumption  
The theory of liberal intergovernmentalism builds on the earlier approach of 
intergovernmental institutionalism by refining its theory of interstate bargaining and 
institutional compliance as well as adding an explicit theory of national interdependence 
grounded in liberal theories of international interdependence. At the core of liberal 
intergovernmentalism are three essential elements:  
 
 The assumption of rational state behaviour  
 A liberal theory of national preference formation and  
 An intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiations.  
 
The assumption of rational state behaviour provides the general framework of the theory. 
Within this framework the costs and benefits of economic interdependence are the 
primary determinants of national preferences. The relative intensity of national 
preferences, the existence of alternative coalitions and the opportunity for issue linkages 
provides the basis for an intergovernmental analysis of the resolution of distributional 
conflicts among governments. Lastly, regime theory is utilized as a starting point for the 
analysis of conditions under which governments will delegate powers to international 
institutions (Moravcsik 1993: 480-481). 
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3.3 The formation of national preferences 
The theory of national preference formation used within the framework of liberal 
intergovernmentalism draws on liberal theories. Liberal theories of international relations 
focus on the effect of state-society relations in shaping national preferences. Herein it is 
assumed that private individuals and voluntary associations with autonomous interests, 
who interact in civil society, are the most fundamental actors in politics. State priorities 
and policies are determined by politicians at the head of the national governments. The 
politicians are embedded in domestic and transitional civil society, which decisively 
constrains their identities and purposes (Moravcsik 1993: 483). For liberals the 
relationship between society and the government is assumed to be a principle-agent 
relation: Societal principals delegate power or constrain governmental agents. The main 
interest of governments is to maintain their power. In democratic societies this requires 
the support of a coalition of domestic voters, parties, interest groups and bureaucracies, 
whose views are transmitted through domestic institutions and practises of political 
representation. Through this process emerges a set of national interests or goals that 
states bring to international negotiations (Moravcsik 1993: 483). 
 
3.3.1 Preferences of supranational cooperation  
In liberal intergovernmentalist terms and more specifically in the terms of regime theory, 
interdependence introduces incentives for multilateralism. These vary with the 
configuration of state interests and the nature of the cooperation problem. In the case of 
common interests in the enforcement of generalized rules, and where distributional issues 
are less acute, multilateral institutions can be expected to predominate (Padgett 2009: 
1068). In the view of liberal intergovernmentalism the interdependence is first and 
foremost economic and in order to agree on joining a legally binding Treaty, one can 
assume that EU partner countries must be convinced that a bilateral cooperation 
agreement is not sufficient to fully exploit the potential economic gains (Prange-Gstöhl 
2009: 5301). With regard to the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy 
Community this means that Ukraine and Moldova must be convinced that the already in 
place bilateral agreements with the EU is not sufficient to exploit the potential gains with 
regard to cooperation on gas. However, severe distributional issues may be difficult to 
handle within the context of multilateral institutions, because they involve the pursuit of 
particular interests which conflict with the generalized principles of conduct, on which 
multilateral institutions are based (Ruggie 1992 in Padgett 2009: 1068). Moreover, where 
partners possess different kinds of powers and are vulnerable to different kinds of risks, 
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bilateral bargaining may be better adjusted to achieving the mixes of benefits and 
opportunities (Strange 1983 in Padgett 2009: 1068).  
 
According to Moravcsik, European integration can be explained by two broad categories 
for and against integration. These are geopolitical interests and economic interests. Each 
serves as the basis for plausible, internally consistent and widely accepted arguments 
about the sources of European integration. The central analytical question about 
preferences in decision-making processes with the EU is therefore what the precise 
nature and relative weight of geopolitical and economic motivations are in the formation of 
preferences concerning European integration (Moravcsik 1998: 26).  
 
3.3.2 Economic motivations 
At the very core of liberal theories of economic interdependence lies the claim that 
increasing transborder flows of goods, services, factors or pollutants create what is called 
international policy externalities among states. This in turn creates incentives for policy co-
ordination. International policy externalities arise where the policy of one government 
create costs and benefits for politically significant social groups outside its national 
jurisdiction (Cooper 1996 in Moravcsik 1993: 485). 
 
National governments have an incentive to cooperate where policy coordination increases 
their control over domestic policy outcomes, permitting them to achieve goals that would 
not otherwise be possible. This situation most often arises when coordination eliminates 
negative international policy externalities. Negative policy externalities refer to a situation 
in which the policies of one state impose costs on the domestic nationals of another, 
thereby undermining the goals of the second government’s policy goals. Examples include 
protectionist barriers against flows of foreign goods and capital, competitive devaluation 
and lax domestic environmental pollution standards (Moravcsik 1993: 485) and as will be 
evident in section 3.3.4 also the trade of gas, which has created a relationship of high 
interdependence between the EU, Russia and Ukraine and Moldova.   
 
In modern international political economy, policy coordination has two major purposes. 
Each of these aims at removing a negative policy externality. The first purpose is the 
accommodation of economic interdependence through reciprocal market liberalization. 
Restrictions on imports and exports are not simply of interest to domestic societal groups, 
but to their counterparts abroad as well. The liberalization of the movement of goods, 
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services and factors of production may promote modernization and a more efficient 
allocation of domestic resources, favouring producers in internationally competitive 
sectors and owners of internationally scarce factors of production. Restrictions on import 
of goods and factors impose negative policy externalities on potential foreign exporters, 
investors and immigrants. The second major purpose of economic coordination is policy 
harmonization in order to assure the continued provision of public goods for which the 
state is domestically responsible. This includes socio-economic equality, macroeconomic 
stability and regulatory protection (Moravcsik 1993: 486). On this background, a main 
question with regard to the analysis of cooperation on gas within the framework of the 
Treaty on gas regards whether the Treaty accommodate the economic interdependence 
and policy harmonization in order to remove negative externalities related to the trade of 
gas between the EU, Russia and Ukraine and Moldova.  
 
Where the policies of two or more governments create negative externalities for one 
another and unilateral adjustment strategies are ineffective, inadequate or expensive, 
economic interdependence creates an unambiguous incentive to coordinate policy. 
However, even where agreements are mutually beneficial, governments often have 
different preferences concerning the distribution of the benefits, leading to conflicts over 
the precise term of the cooperation. The costs and benefits of policy coordination are 
often unevenly distributed among and within states, rendering nearly inevitable a measure 
of international and domestic conflict between winners and losers. States and domestic 
groups that are disadvantaged by policy coordination are likely to oppose it and only 
where governments can collectively overcome such is cooperation possible. The 
distribution of the expected societal costs provides a means of predicting the nature of 
political conflict and cooperation in the EU, both internationally and domestically 
(Moravcsik 1993: 487).  
 
3.3.3 Geopolitical motivations 
The term geopolitics reflects the interplay between power and interests, strategic decision-
making and geographical space. Therefore, the essence of geopolitical explanations for 
national preference formation concerning economic cooperation lies in the linkage 
between economic policies and underlying political or military goals. The focus is on the 
indirect consequences of economic integration, named security externalities. In this 
sense, economic integration is not an end in itself, but a mean to manipulate. Therefore, 
governments are assumed to cooperate economically with those states which they are 
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allied with in the pursuit of particular geopolitical goals. Geopolitical interests reflect 
perceived threats to national sovereignty or territorial integrity, whether military or 
ideological (Moravcsik 1998: 27).   
 
Whatever the security externalities, the core of the argument remains the same: 
Governments are more likely to cooperate economically with those states with which they 
are allied with in pursuit of a particular geopolitical goal. According to Moravcsik this is a 
plausible argument because the international system is believed to be an anarchic and 
potentially dangerous place. Hence, threats to security and sovereignty remain at the top 
of motives of state motives (Moravcsik 1998: 27-29). An important distinction is however 
that where realists attribute the sources of the geopolitical security threats to particular 
configuration of power, liberal theories attribute them to extreme conflict among 
ideological, institutional and material preferences (Moravcsik 2010: 15). In the light of this, 
a main focus of the analysis of the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy 
Community is the establishment of the main geopolitical threats to the energy security of 
the EU on the one side and Ukraine on the other. A central question is to whether these 
geopolitical threats differ and what this means for the preferences of cooperation on gas 
within the framework of the Treaty.  
 
Below are the economic and geopolitical preferences of energy cooperation further 
established and hereby the theoretical relationship between the security threats related to 
the trade of gas is established.  
 
3.3.4 Economic and geopolitical preferences of energy cooperation 
As introduced above, European integration can be explained by two broad categories for 
and against integration. These are geopolitical interests and economic interests. Each 
serves as the basis for plausible, internally consistent and widely accepted arguments 
about the sources of European integration. The central analytical question about 
preferences in decision-making processes with the EU is therefore what the precise 
nature and relative weight of geopolitical and economic motivations are in the formation of 
preferences concerning European integration. The following study applies the theory of 
liberal intergovernmentalism to analyse EU integration with regard to the integration of 
Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community. This is possible because cooperation 
with regard to gas energy security within the framework of the Treaty can be analysed as 
based on geopolitical and economic motivations as the trade of gas establish a 
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relationship of interdependence of which geopolitical and economic motivations are of vital 
importance. The central analytical question is therefore the same. Starting with the 
geopolitical nature this relates to the pipeline trade of gas and the many sovereign 
territories the gas pipelines need to cross. This higher the risk of political or commercial 
conflict occurring as a great number of actors translate into a greater number of conflicting 
interests that need to be taken into account to ensure the safe passage of gas (Yafimava 
2011: 4). As Russia is the main supplier of gas to the EU and the gas that reaches the EU 
travels through Ukraine and Moldova, the pipeline gas trade interlocks Russia, European 
buyers and Ukraine and Moldova into a long-term relationship of high interdependence, 
confer section 2.2 and section 4.1.2. With regard to this and in liberal intergovernmental 
terms, the geopolitical explanations for national preference formation concerning energy 
cooperation can be understood in lying in the linkage between energy policies and the 
competition for, the control of as well as the securing of reliable access to the supply of 
gas. 
 
With regard to the claim of liberal intergovernmentalism that economic interdependence 
creates negative policy externalities, in which policy externalities takes place due to the 
transborder flows of goods, services, factors or pollutants and national governments have 
an incentive to cooperate when policy coordination eliminates negative international policy 
externalities, the gas disputes of 2006 and 2009 between Russia and Ukraine showed 
how the actions of one government in the area of energy can create costly economic 
international policy externalities for other governments. The reason is that whilst oil is 
traded globally and moved round widely, the trade of gas relies on pipelines crossing 
several countries, making domestic policies on gas even more exposed to externalities. 
Such externalities can have large micro- and macro-economic costs. The reason is that 
imports and export of energy have an enormous impact on the balance of payments whilst 
subsidies, taxation and the costs of revenues of state-owned companies may have a 
considerable influence on the state budget. Moreover, the costs of energy are an 
important factor in the rate of inflation and in the international competitive position of a 
country’s economy (Correlje & Linde 2005: 532). Therefore, in order to avoid such 
negative policy externalities, governments may decide to cooperate on energy.  
 
In the light of this, liberal intergovernmentalism is found to be well suited to analyse the 
Treaty because of the link between economic and geopolitical motivations and energy 
cooperation. However, as established in section 2.4 the economic and geopolitical 
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motivations for cooperating on energy for the EU and Ukraine and Moldova depends on 
different economic and geopolitical motivations because gas energy security means 
different things for either. Therefore, the link between energy and the economic and 
geopolitical motivations as part of liberal intergovernmentalism is only first fully 
established in chapter four and five where the economic and geopolitical challenges 
related to gas energy security for the EU and Ukraine and Moldova are established.  
 
3.4 Interstate bargaining 
When moving from the domestic to the international level, liberal intergovernmentalism 
has to explain how intergovernmental bargaining is shaped. Of particular analytical 
importance is the extent to which state preferences are compatible or conflictual, the 
balance of common gains and distributional trade-offs between states (Moravcsik 1995: 
26). Thus, the fundamental concept is asymmetrical independence. The concept was first 
introduced by Keohane and Nye in 1977 and refers to that states which are going to gain 
the most from international cooperation are more willing to compromise. Therefore, 
countries expecting to get large benefits have the most intense preferences for an 
agreement and are disposed to make concessions in order to reach it, because it would 
still make them better-off than status quo. By contrast, countries for which agreement is 
less important are likely to see their priorities get through, because they can only credibly 
threaten not to ratify any agreement far from their preferences (Montanari 2007: 6). 
 
Within the framework of liberal intergovernmentalism, Moravcsik uses the international 
bargaining theory as starting point for the analysis of interstate negotiations. The theory 
rests on three assumptions. First, negotiations take place within a noncoercive 
environment in which governments can and will reject agreements that would make them 
worse off than unilateral policies. Second, the transaction costs of generating information 
and ideas are low relative to the benefits of interstate cooperation. Third, the distribution of 
benefits reflects relative bargaining power, which in turn is shaped by the pattern of policy 
interdependence (Moravcsik 1998: 60-62).   
 
Bargaining leverage stems most fundamentally from asymmetries in the relative intensity 
of national preferences, which in a liberal intergovernmentalist view reflect costs and 
benefits of agreements to remove negative externalities. In negotiating policy 
coordination, the terms will favour those governments who are able to remove negative 
externalities by opening markets to which others intensely desire access, modifying 
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policies others intensely desire to change, or distributing resources others intensely desire 
to share. The more intensely governments desire agreements, the more concessions and 
the greater efforts they will expend to achieve it (Moravcsik 1998: 60-64). Thus, Moravcsik 
argues that the bargaining is Pareto-efficient, meaning that the gains from the outcome of 
bargaining favour one country over the other. Hence, governments that gain most from a 
common policy will be more inclined to offer concessions in order to have their interests 
realized (Kusku 2010: 156).  
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4. EU energy security challenges  
 
In the following chapter EU energy security in general is first established. Following this, 
the gas transit dimension and the importance of Ukraine and Moldova in this regard is 
introduced. This includes an introduction to the gas transportation system and answers 
the first research question on how the trade of gas create a relationship of 
interdependence between the EU and Ukraine and Moldova.  The geopolitics and the 
economy of the transit dimension of EU energy security with regard to gas transit games 
are hereafter established. The main conclusions regarding the geopolitical and economic 
challenges to the enhancement of the gas transit dimension of EU energy security is lastly 
summarized.  
 
4.1 EU energy security and the transit of gas 
External as well as internal factors have caused the EU to begin more seriously to plan for 
a common energy future and to make energy policy a higher priority within the EU. The 
factors include steadily rising energy prices, declining European energy production and a 
fragmented internal energy market (Belkin and Morelli 2007: 2). On this background, the 
aim of the EU is to avoid what is referred to as strategic dependence. With regard to gas, 
this means the development of alternative energy transport routes, reducing the 
dependency of the EU on Gazprom as the main supplier of gas to Europe (Niewiem 2008: 
267-268) as well as establishing stable neighbourhood relations in order to avoid more cut 
offs of gas. With regard to the later, it is specifically the gas disputes between Ukraine and 
Russia in 2006 and in 209 which have elevated transit security to the top of EU energy 
security thinking (Motyl 2006: 3 and Yafimava 2011: 1).  
 
With regard to gas energy security, the transit of gas is governed by bilateral transit 
contracts. Together with long-term supply contracts these contracts constitute an 
important component of gas supply security for the EU. The importance stems from the 
delivery points of gas to Europe. Unless a seller and a buyer share a common border, a 
transit country needs to be in place to underpin a long-term supply contract. Whether a 
transit contract is concluded between a seller and a transit country, or between a buyer 
and a transit country, depends on the deliveries points specified in the long-term supply 
contract. If a seller is to deliver gas only up to a delivery point located on its own national 
border, then a transit contract is concluded between the transit country and a byer. In 
contrast, if a seller is to deliver gas to an agreed delivery point beyond its national border, 
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then a transit contract is concluded between a seller and the transit country across whose 
territories this has to flow to reach its delivery point. When the European long-term supply 
contracts with Gazprom were extended during 2004 to 2006 there was only little change in 
the delivery points for the delivering of gas by Gazprom to Europe compared to during the 
Soviet period. Therefore, Gazprom had to continue using the pipelines travelling through 
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova and thus to continue signing transit contracts with these 
countries (Yafimava 2011: 22). This makes the transit contracts between Gazprom and 
Ukraine and Moldova crucial to the energy security of the EU and thus also the gas transit 
dimension of EU energy security.  
 
With regard to the transit of gas from Russia to Europe, Ukraine holds the most pivotal 
position to the EU in its neighbourhood. Just under 80 per cent of Russian gas exports to 
Europe is delivered via Ukraine (Dimitrova & Dragneva 2009: 865). The picture below 
shows the pipelines systems.  
 
 
(Stern 2005: 3).  
 
In terms of volume, the exports of gas from Canada to the United States are the only 
bilateral gas trade that worldwide exceeds the trade from Russia to Ukraine. Therefore, 
Ukrainian gas transit flows are also by far the largest in international gas trade. This is 
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regardless of much of the export strategy of Gazprom since the breakup of the Soviet 
Union has been oriented towards reducing or at least not increasing transit through 
Ukraine (Stern 2005: 86-87).  Though only being a minor transit country, Moldova is also 
an important transit country along which gas to Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and the 
Balkans must pass. In 2003 this amounted to more than 22 bcm of gas. All gas transited 
through Moldova are first transited through Ukraine (Stern 2005: 101 and Gombos & 
Mateescu 2012: 36).  
 
4.1.1 The geopolitics of the gas transit dimension of EU energy security 
It has above been established that the structure of the gas transit system makes Gazprom 
responsible for the conclusion of gas transit contracts with Ukraine and Moldova. As it is 
these contracts that ensure the transit of gas to Europe, the contracts were concluded as 
crucial to the energy security of the EU and specifically the gas transit dimension of EU 
energy security. The importance of the contracts was highlighted by the gas crises 
between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and in 2009 where the failure to agree on a price of 
gas as well as over the transit of gas lead Russia to shut off the gas supply to Ukraine 
(Stern 2006: 7-9 and Stern et al. 2009: 4). Taking into consideration that the geopolitics of 
energy has been established to concern the competition for, the control of as well as the 
securing of reliable access to the supply of gas (confer section 3.3.4) the worsening 
relationship between Russia and Ukraine can be found to constitute a geopolitical 
challenge to the energy security of the EU as it has make the EU uncertain of the security 
of the gas transit across Ukraine. In the same way the relations between Russia and 
Moldova on energy also constitute a geopolitical challenge to the energy security of the 
EU as the relationship between Russia and Moldova also is characterized by disputes 
with regard to energy. Specifically, the price of gas as well as the gas debts of the 
separatist region of Transnistria has led to a worsening of the relationship between Russia 
and Moldova (Yafimava 2011: 4).  
 
The worsening relationships between Russia and Ukraine and Moldova with regard to gas 
can be seen as proof of the geopolitical nature of the transit of gas in the sense that the 
more sovereign territories which pipelines need to cross, the higher is the risk of political 
or commercial conflict occurring. This is due to the fact that a great number of actors 
translate into a greater number of conflicting interests that need to be taken into account 
to ensure the safe passage of gas (Yafimava 2011: 4). As Russia is the main supplier of 
gas to the EU and the gas that reaches the EU travels through Ukraine and Moldova, the 
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pipeline gas trade interlocks Russia, European buyers and Ukraine and Moldova into a 
long-term relationship of high interdependence. Therefore, good and predictable political 
and commercial relations between seller, buyer, and transit countries are necessary to 
ensure the reliable and efficient operation of the transportation networks (Yafimava 2011: 
4-5).  
    
Geopolitical conflicts over gas are known as gas transit games. Gas transit games often 
arise because producers and consumers are separated by large distances, which also 
tend to grow in relation to the depletion of nearby gas fields. The connection of supply and 
demand involves several problems including politics, logistics, incentives for additional 
investment and safeguards against hold ups. This is even more the case if the system 
involves a producer and a consumer that are separated by a third country. If the third 
country is seeking rent for transit as Ukraine and Moldova does or sabotaging pipelines as 
has been the case in Afghanistan, then the third country is creating an externality that 
infringes both the consumer and producer. If producers and consumers are directly linked, 
such problems can be avoided (Yegorov & Wirl 2009: 147). One way around the classical 
energy transit problem is to invest in what can be termed transit avoidance infrastructure. 
If the net present value of the future energy transaction flows is higher for the source and 
destination countries in the case of transit avoidance, it makes economic sense for the 
source and destination countries to build the transit avoidance infrastructure. If this takes 
place, it will have large consequences for the transit country. Whilst the transit country will 
continue to import from the source country by the former route, it will meanwhile lose the 
ability to charge a transit fee as well as lose its former leverage on the transaction 
between the source and destination countries. The loss is even larger if one assumes that 
the supplier resorts to deliberate supply cuts (Christie 2009: 15).  
 
4.1.2 The economy of the transit dimension of energy security 
Gas transit games are not only of importance to the energy security of the EU due to the 
geopolitical character of the games, but also in economic terms as they are related to 
market structures, externalities and emerging games. The potential damage to each party 
involved in gas transit games depends on the duration of the conflict. However in practise 
losses may start earlier than predicted if countries start to ration gas reserves prior to their 
depletion (Yegorov & Wirl 2009: 150-151). With regard to gas conflicts such as the ones 
between Russia and Ukraine in 2206 and in 2009, although the EU is not a strategic actor 
in this kind of conflicts, the EU is according to Yegorov & Wirl the party facing the highest 
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costs of the conflicts due to the dire lack of reserves among its member states. As a 
result, for each day supply interruptions continue, additional consumers will be cut off. 
Therefore, the EU has a strong incentive to settle such conflicts, by arbitration or even by 
other means, such as threats or bribery (Yegorov & Wirl 2009: 150-151). The lack of 
transparency, an adequate alert mechanism and proper infrastructure were important 
components to why the gas crises in 2006 and 2009 also affected the EU as the EU was 
not able to closely monitor the energy trade between EU and Russia. Therefore, an 
immediate result of the gas crisis of 2009 was also the agreeing of a team of EU, Russian 
and Ukrainian monitors to be deployed to check the energy systems at the Russian and 
Ukrainian frontiers. Though, this being a positive step, the move was no more than a stop-
gap measure (Gnedina & Emerson 2009: 4) and a more extensive framework for 
monitoring as well as improving the transparency and infrastructure of especially the 
Ukrainian gas sector is important in order to enhance the transit dimension EU energy 
security (Yafimava 2011: 24). 
 
With regard to the specific economic damage of transit games, a usual way of computing 
the loss is in consumer surplus. Using this method on Ukraine, Austria and Germany (due 
to the high fraction of Russian gas in consumption of these countries) Yuri Yegorov & 
Franz Wirl amount the daily welfare loss for Ukraine to be 105 million dollars, for Austria 
19 million dollars and for Germany 84 million dollars. This amounts to a monthly loss for 
Ukraine of about 3 billion dollars following the drying up of reserves. Since the 
dependency of Austria and Germany on Russian gas is intermediate (respectively 63 per 
cent for Austria and 43 per cent for Germany compared to 80 per cent for Ukraine) and 
their population accounts for 50 per cent of those in the EU affected by the cut off of gas 
supplies, the daily loss in the EU, when the storage is empty, is close to 0.2 billion dollars 
per day or 6 billion dollars per month. This amounts to a yearly welfare loss of 73 billion 
dollars. The losses for Ukraine and Russia are in contrast much smaller during the first 5-
6 months of such conflicts, since they can rely on their reserves during that time (Yegorov 
& Wirl 2009: 151).  
 
The conclusions by Yegorov & Wirl are supported by a Commission assessment of the 
impact of the gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine in 2009. Here the Commission 
stresses that the crisis demonstrated the vulnerability of the EU to gas disruptions as it 
resulted in economic repercussions on private households as well as industries in a 
number of EU member states. In order to avoid similar incidents and economic 
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repercussions, the Commission points to enhanced engagement with the major suppliers 
as well as transit countries. This can according to the Commission provide an appropriate 
framework for developing early warning mechanisms and adequate communication links 
for notifying of possible difficulties and facilitating possible solutions in case of disruption 
of gas supplies (European Commission SEC 2009/977 final: 7). 
 
Taking the economy as well as the geopolitics of gas transit games into account, the 
security of gas supply for the EU can be defined as an acceptable level of threat of supply 
and price disruptions, which may arise in the transit part of the gas supply chain.  
 
4.2 Sub-conclusion 
The main economic and geopolitical challenges to the transit dimension of EU energy 
security stem from the consequences related to gas transit games. In turn, the challenges 
related to gas transit games stem from the structure of the transit of gas as the structure 
makes Gazprom responsible for establishing transit agreements with Ukraine and 
Moldova due to the delivery points for gas to Europe are beyond the national border of 
Russia. The falls in volumes of gas in Europe during the gas disputes between Russia 
and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 highlight the importance of the conclusion of these transit 
contracts and the economic consequences for the EU when the conclusions fail. The 
disputes are of importance to the transit dimension of EU energy security as the 
worsening relationship between Ukraine and Russia has heightened the concerns of the 
EU over security of gas transit. Good and predictable political and commercial relations 
between seller, buyer, and transit countries are established as necessary in order to 
ensure the reliable and efficient operation of the transportation networks. This makes the 
worsening relationship between Russia and Ukraine a geopolitical challenge to the transit 
dimension of EU energy security. Moreover, gas transit games are also of importance in 
economic terms as they are related to market structures, externalities and emerging 
games. Although the EU is not a strategic actor in the conflicts between Ukraine and 
Russia, the EU can be perceived as the party facing the highest costs of the conflicts due 
to the lack of reserves among its member states. As a result, for each day supply 
interruptions continue, additional consumers will be cut off.  
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5. Energy security challenges of Moldova and Ukraine 
 
In the following chapter the energy security challenges of Ukraine and Moldova are first 
established with regard to the geopolitical challenges related to the relationship with 
Russia. Hereafter the economic energy security challenges are established. This include 
the economy of the import dependency on Russia and the outdated energy systems, the 
economy of the transit of gas and gas debts as well as development of competing 
pipelines. The main findings are lastly summarised.  
 
5.1 The geopolitics of energy security for Ukraine and Moldova 
The main economic challenges with regard to gas energy security stem for Ukraine and 
Moldova from their relations on energy with Russia. For both Ukraine and Moldova, the 
relationships with Russia with regard to gas are characterized by gas import 
dependencies and because of these also complicated business relationships as Russia 
uses its political power over Ukraine and Moldova with regard to gas to pressure both 
countries on energy issues. Moreover, for Moldova the relationship with Russia with 
regard to gas is furthermore complicated by the conflict over the separatist region of 
Transnistria as Russia also here uses its political power to pressure Moldova on gas 
issues. Below are the relationship between Ukraine and Russia and how this poses a 
geopolitical challenge for Ukraine first established. Following this, the relationship 
between Moldova and Russia and the geopolitical challenges related to this is 
established.  
 
5.1.1 The relationship between Ukraine and Russia 
Unstable energy supplies are the number one problem for Ukraine in terms of the effects 
on the economy, political instability as well as relations with Russia. The unstable energy 
supplies with regard to gas are the result of both an ineffective domestic production of gas 
as well as the dependency on gas imports from Russia. With regard to the latter, Russia 
has continued to be the biggest supplier of gas to Ukraine, covering 75-80 per cent of 
natural gas imports in Ukraine (Umbach 2011: 95-98). The dependency of Ukraine on gas 
imports from Russia has been explicitly used for political purposes of Russia. Specifically, 
Russia has repeatedly used price and indirect taxation as a policy lever and has by such 
exploited its monopoly over resources by limiting the supply of energy. The gas disputes 
in 2006 and in 2009 between Ukraine and Russia are examples of this. The first dispute 
between Russia and Ukraine started in the late 2005 when Russia notified the Ukrainian 
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government of a significant price increase in natural gas flowing to Ukraine (Belkin & 
Mellini 2007: 4-5). The notification came in the wake of months of disputes between 
Ukraine and the Russian gas monopoly Gazprom (Stern 2006: 4-5). Though the problem 
was settled, the relationship between Russia and Ukraine soon become strained once 
again when Gazprom demanded that Ukraine from the beginning of 2006 should pay 
European prices of between 160-230 dollars/mcm unless it was prepared to consider 
allowing Gazprom an equity stake in the transit pipeline network (Stern 2006: 7-8). When 
no price was agreed, Gazprom cut off gas supplies to Ukraine on 1 January 2006. The cut 
off however only lasted a few days and on 4 January 2006 Gazprom and Naftogaz 
announced an end to the dispute with a signing of a 5 year contract (Stern 2006: 9).  
 
In January 2009 the situation was repeated when Russia and Ukraine failed to agree a 
price for Russian gas to Ukraine and a tariff for the transport of Russian gas to Europe 
before the previous agreement expired by the end of 2009. More specifically, the dispute 
was set in motion by disagreement over the debt by the Ukrainian state holding company 
Naftogaz Ukrainy. The settlement of the Ukrainian gas debt was according to Gazprom a 
prerequisite for a new gas agreement to be settled. After months of struggles, Naftogaz 
decided to pay its debt, just hours before the official deadline. However, following the 
payment of the gas debt, Gazprom offered Ukraine a gas price increase to 250 
dollars/mcm in 2009, a transit tariff remaining unchanged at 1.7 dollars/mcm/100km and 
lastly an offer to Naftogaz to make an upfront payment for transit services rendered in the 
first quarter of 2009. Ukrainian President Yuschenko sharply criticised the offer for the gas 
price was being too high and the tariff being too low (Yafimava 2011: 180-182). The result 
was the gas dispute, which by far was most serious of its kind as Russian exports were 
cut off on 1 January 2009 (Stern 2009: 4). The dispute was ended by the negotiation and 
signed of two new supply and transit contracts on 19 January and gas flows to Europe 
restarted on the 20 January and two days later returned to normal levels (Yafimava 2011: 
189).   
 
Though both gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine have been settled within a few 
weeks, the gas disputes show how the dependence of Ukraine on gas imports from 
Russia has been explicitly used for geopolitical purposes of Russia. The attempt of Russia 
to make a new gas contract dependent on receiving a stake in the Ukrainian transit 
pipeline network is an example of this when considering that the geopolitics of energy in 
section 3.3.3 encompassed the competition for as well as the control of the supply of gas. 
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Moreover, it is evident that the price of gas as well as the tariffs for the transit of the 
Russian gas is highly important to the energy security of Ukraine. This is especially the 
case because of the economy of the transit of gas, the price of gas as well as the 
consequences of the gas debts related to this. This is established within the variable of 
the economy of energy security, more specifically with regard to the economy of the 
transit of gas in section 5.2.2. The disputes do however also have other geopolitical 
implications, by far the most important for Ukraine being the building of transit avoidance 
infrastructures. As this has large economic consequences for Ukraine, this is established 
as part of the economic variable of the economy of energy security, specifically with 
regard to the economy of the construction of competing pipelines in section 5.2.3   
 
5.1.2 The relationship between Moldova and Russia 
The relationship between Moldova and Russia is first of all characterized by the 
dependency of Moldova on gas imports from Russia. Moldova has no indigenous gas 
production and imports all of its requirements. As a result, Gazprom has been the only 
supplier of gas to Moldova since 2004. The dependency of Moldova on gas imports from 
Russia has been used as a geopolitical policy lever by Russia to increase the price of gas. 
Within the period of 1996 to 2005 Gazprom charged Moldova the highest price on gas in 
the Commonwealth of Independent States by charging Moldova 80 dollars/mcm. Since 
then, Gazprom has slowly increased its price for Moldova to 170 dollars/mcm in 2007 
(Yafimava 2011: 272-273).  
 
Setting the gas import dependency aside, the relationship with regard to gas between 
Moldova and Russia is furthermore complicated by the conflict over Transnistria. 
Transnistria is a strip of land between the Dniester River and the Ukrainian border. The 
region was heavily industrialised by the Soviets and around 40 per cent of the entire 
industrial production of Moldova still originates here. For these reasons, the region also 
gradually gained a special status in relations with Moscow, which saw the region as more 
economically and politically reliable than the more rural and Romanian-speaking 
population to the west of the Dniester River. In response to a range of language reforms 
and suspicion of Moldova soon would join Romania, the population of Transnistria 
established their own republic within the Soviet Union in 1990. Following the proclamation 
of the independence of Moldova in 1991, the region also proclaimed its own 
independence (Gombos & Mateescu 2012: 37-38). Attempting to restore control, the 
central authorities in Moldova faced both resistance of locals and the Russian 14th Army. 
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The conflict ended in July 1992 when a ceasefire agreement was signed which was to be 
ensured by a military force consisting of Moldovan, Transnistrian and Russian troops. The 
Moldovan authorities have since the conclusion of the ceasefire waited for the removal of 
the Russian military troops in Transnistria as the region under international law still 
continues to be under the sovereignty of Moldova (Gombos & Mateescu 2012: 37-38). 
The region is currently still de facto independent, but has not been recognised by any 
state. This includes Russia (Gombos & Mateescu 2012: 37-38).  
 
The conflict over Transnistria entails both geopolitical as well as economic challenges for 
the enhancement of gas energy security for Moldova. With regard to the geopolitical 
challenges, the conflict may lead Russia to take over a further stake of the Moldovan 
transit pipelines as Transnistria currently is negotiating with Gazprom to sell the regions 
stake in the Moldovan transit pipelines. This is possible because of the large gas debts of 
Transnistria, which in turn are accumulated because of the large economic consequences 
of the conflict in Transnistria. Additionally, Gazprom has filed several suits against 
Moldovagaz, a joint venture between Moldova and Russia, at the international commercial 
arbitration court in Moscow in an attempt to make Moldovagaz pay when having failed to 
get payments from the Transnistrian gas company, Tiraspoltransgaz (Yafimava 2011: 
264-274). Thus, Russia is using the conflict to its own advance in order to gain a larger 
stake of the Moldovan transit pipeline system. Thus, Russia aims to expand its control 
over the gas network system in Moldova. This can be considered a geopolitical challenge 
to the enhancement of the energy security of Moldova. The importance of the conflict over 
Transnistria to the energy security of Moldova is further established in section 5.2.2.   
 
5.2 The economy of energy security for Ukraine and Moldova 
The geopolitical challenges of the use of political power of Russia to the energy security of 
Ukraine and Moldova were above established. Herein a range of economic challenges to 
the energy security of Ukraine and Moldova were shortly introduced. In the following 
section these are further established.  
 
5.2.1 The economy of the gas import dependency and the outdated energy systems 
The dependency of gas imports from Russia gives Russia the lever to raise the price of 
gas without any warning or consideration to the economic situation in Ukraine. This can 
be considered an economic energy security challenge to Ukraine because of the current 
structure of the economy of Ukraine has emerged on the basis of ample energy supplies 
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at low prices. Accordingly, a transition of gas prices towards internationally competitive 
levels constitutes major economic challenges to Ukraine due to the risk of energy price 
shocks (German Institute 2007: 2). The same is the case with Moldova. Higher gas prices 
on imported gas will immediately result in a larger import bill. If no financing of this is 
available, the demand for other imports must be reduced. This will imply a reduction in 
domestic consumption and investment demand and reduced domestic production. 
Depending on the exact increase in the prices on energy, the energy price shocks will 
reduce the GDP of Moldova (Tiongson et al. 2007: 10).  
 
Beside the dependency on gas import from Russia, a main energy challenge of Ukraine 
and Moldova regards the low levels of energy efficiency with regard to the production of 
gas. Starting with Ukraine, this is first and foremost a consequence of the energy 
production system of Ukraine is outdated. This has contributed to a fall in the gas 
production whilst the state of disrepair of the old pipelines increases the possibility of 
accidents. For the pipeline gas pumping units, these are in such a bad condition that 
increasing amounts of gas are needed to pump gas through the pipelines (Balmaceda 
2004: 8).  As a consequence, without restructuring, modernization and liberal market 
reforms, Ukraine will be unable to cope with its energy supply challenges, reducing its 
extremely high energy consumption. Therefore, for the energy security of Ukraine, raising 
energy efficiency is one of the most important tasks and challenges of the Ukrainian 
authorities (Umbach 2011: 95-98).  With regard to Moldova, the fact that the energy 
system in Moldova is in a state of advanced usage also entail a domestic economic 
challenge to the energy security of Moldova. Ensuring energy efficiency will materialise 
among others through the modernization of the energy system, implementation of efficient 
energy technologies and involvement of own energy resources. In order to develop and 
modernize the energy sector, the Moldovan authorities underline that attracting 
investments are of special importance. This implies the creating and strengthening of 
mechanisms to attract and use efficiently funding for energy projects, use rationally state 
investment and private investments in energy development projects as well as developing 
an information base and a database for energy project funding (Moldova 2007: 41-44).  
 
5.2.2 The economy of the transit of gas and gas debts  
Facing severe energy problems that affect the economic situation in Ukraine, the role as a 
transit country for Russian gas transited to Western and Central Europe comes even more 
important for Ukraine. Of special importance for Ukraine is the ensuring of high transit 
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fees. The fee for transporting gas through Ukraine is negotiated between Gazprom and 
Naftogaz. The transit fee is not paid in cash but as a gas equivalent (Optiz & 
Hirschhausen 2001: 155-156). Since 2001 Russia has eliminated a guarantee to supply 
Ukraine with 30 bcm of gas as payment for transit. Instead Gazprom now guarantees 
Ukraine supply of 26 bcm as payment for transit with extra supplies to be paid in cash 
(Yafimava 2011: 154). Thereby Russia forces Ukraine to buy up to five bcm of gas 
annually in order to compensate for the decrease in the amount of gas supply in exchange 
for transit (Yafimava 2011: 159-160). The reduction in the amount of gas paid by Russia in 
exchange for transit is an example of how the structure of the gas transit system (in which 
Gazprom is responsible for the transit contracts) is used strategically by Russia to lower 
the price it has to pay for the gas transit in Ukraine. The economic consequences are for 
Ukraine a reduction in the volumes of gas paid by Russia. In order to compensate for this, 
Ukraine will have to buy up the five bcm of gas annually, making the strategically use of 
the transit system by Russia both an economic and geopolitical challenge to the energy 
security of Ukraine because of the economic consequences as well as the challenge of 
ensuring a reliable access to the supply of gas. Moreover, Ukraine will also suffer 
economically in the case of gas transit games such as the gas crises between Ukraine 
and Russia in 2006 and in 2009. Computing the loss in consumer surplus the daily welfare 
loss in Ukraine has been found to be 105 million dollars. This amounts to a monthly loss 
for Ukraine of about 3 billion dollars. The losses for Ukraine are however smaller during 
the first 5-6 months of such conflicts, since it can rely on its reserves during that time, 
confer section 4.2.2.  
 
The control and operation of the Moldovan gas sector is taken care of Moldovagaz. 
Gazprom owns 50 per cent of the venture and has furthermore since 2005 held 13.44 per 
cent of Moldovagaz shares owned by the Transnistrian administration in trust 
management. The Moldovan state owns 35.33 per cent of the venture, whilst the 
remaining 1.23 per cent is owned by individual shareholders. Gazprom required its 50 per 
cent share in Moldovagaz as debt repayment and is now negotiating to acquire the 13.44 
per cent Transnistrian stake in the same way (Pirani 2009: 174 & Yafimava 2011: 264). 
Should Transnistria become an autonomous region within a Moldovan unitary state, the 
Moldovan government could challenge any take-over of property located in the region if it 
was carried out without its approval. On the other hand, should Transnistria become a 
republic in a new federal state of Moldova, re-privatization would be a less likely scenario 
than legitimization of de facto existing ownership arrangements, although it cannot be 
38 
 
ruled out. Therefore, should Gazprom acquire the Transnistrian part of the transit network 
and Moldova in the future do not become an unitary state or Moldova becomes a republic 
in the federal state of Moldova, Moldova risks losing another part of their transit network 
(Yafimava 211: 264). Economically, this means losing a future potential part of the 
revenues from transit tariffs. Whilst the European gas transmission tariff is between 2.00–
2.50 dollars/mcm/100km, Moldova is charging a transit tariff of 2.50 dollars/mcm/100km. 
Thus, the Moldovan gas transit tariff is high in comparison with most European gas transit 
tariffs (World Bank Group 2010: 313). The high transit tariff in Moldova is counterbalanced 
by a high price on imported gas from Gazprom (Pirani 2009: 177-178).  Therefore, losing 
yet another part of their transit network and thus another potential part of the transit 
revenues, Moldova may in the future lose the possibility of acquiring the Transnistrian 
stake in the network and thus revenues of which currently are being used to 
counterbalance the high prices of gas imported from Russia for Moldova.  
 
The future legal status of Transnistria is moreover important in terms of the ability of the 
region to pay for gas imports and repay its huge gas debt to Gazprom. Even though most 
of Moldova’s gas-intensive industries are located in Transnistria, the region is responsible 
for the major part of the gas debt of Moldova (Yafimava 2011: 266-268). The improvement 
of the payment discipline of Transnistria is depending on an improvement of the economy 
as well as on a settlement of the dispute with Moldova and thus on the political and legal 
status of the country. As its economy improves the region will prove more able to pay for 
gas consumption as well as to repay its gas debt. However, for the economy to improve, 
the legal status of the region also has to be settled. The major reason is that foreign 
exports are the major single source of the foreign currency revenues of Transnistria, but 
foreign trade to the Ukrainian, Russian and European markets can be only conducted 
freely only when the regions status is defined (Yafimava 2011: 264-274).  
 
The low payment discipline of Transnistria has important implications for the economy of 
Moldova, especially because it is the Moldova-registered joint venture Moldovagaz and 
not Tiraspoltransgaz that is party to a contract with Gazprom. It is therefore only 
Moldovagaz that de jure can be held responsible for non-payment by Tiraspoltransgaz. In 
fact, Gazprom has already filed several suits against Moldovagaz at the international 
commercial arbitration court in Moscow in an attempt to make Moldovagaz pay when 
having failed to get payments from Tiraspoltransgaz. Though losing in the court, 
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Moldovagaz has stated that it will not pay debts for gas consumed by other entities (Pirani 
2009: 175).  
 
In sum, should Russia use the conflict over Transnistria to take over a further stake of the 
Moldovan network, this is both a geopolitical challenge (because of the loosing of control 
over a larger part of the gas system) as well as an economic challenge (due to the 
revenues from the transit of gas in the system is used to counterbalance the high prices of 
gas in Moldova). Moreover, the attempt of Gazprom to make Moldova pay for the gas debt 
of Transnistria indicate a worsening of the relationship of energy between Moldova and 
Russia and can have large economic as well as geopolitical consequences should 
Gazprom succeed in using its political power over Moldova and make Moldova pay the 
gas debts of Transnistria.  
 
5.2.3 The development of competing pipelines 
The discontent by Russia and the Western European gas industry over the political, 
technical and economic reliability of Ukrainian transit services favoured the development 
of a competing pipeline linking Russia and Central and Western Europe together through 
Belarus, Poland and finally Germany (Optiz & Hirschhausen 2001: 164). The pipeline is 
called the Yamal Pipeline and was taken into use in 1999 (Stern 2005: 97). The maximum 
capacity of the pipeline is about 33 bcm, but the pipeline has since the very start only 
exported about 17 bcm yearly (Borisocheva 2007: 7). In comparison, the Ukrainian transit 
capacity total is approximately 130 bcm per year (Hirschhausen et al. 2005: 19). Other 
pipelines challenging the position of Ukraine as the main transit country of Russian gas to 
Europe is the Nord Stream and the South Stream. The construction of the first of the two 
Nord Stream pipelines began in April 2010 and was completed in June 2011 with gas 
transport began in November 2011. The construction of the second line began in May 
2011 and was completed in April 2012. The line is expected to come on stream in the last 
quarter of 2012. Each line has a transport capacity of roughly 27.5 bcm of natural gas per 
year. Thus, by the end of 2012 both lines of the Nord Stream system will be operational 
and combined the new pipelines will be able to deliver up to 55 bcm of gas annually (Nord 
Stream Website 2012). The official groundwork for the South Stream was laid down much 
later than the Nord Stream. The South Stream is supposed to provide 30 bcm of gas to 
consumers along two major routes. The first axis will run through the Balkans north to 
Hungary, where storage facilities will be built. Eventually, the South Stream will reach 
Austria. It may later be extended to Northern Italy. The second, southern axis will provide 
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natural gas to the markets in Greece (Dusseult 2009: 29-30). Russia has signed 
intergovernmental agreements with Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Greece, Slovenia, Austria 
and Croatia for the purpose of implementing the onshore pipeline section in Europe. The 
construction of the pipeline is assumed to start in 2010 and the first gas supplies is 
scheduled for 2015 (South Stream Website 2012).  
 
Whilst the Yamal pipeline reduced the gas transited through Ukraine from Russia, the 
consequences of the construction of the Nord Stream and South Stream is much more 
damaging to Ukraine. As a consequence of the new offshore pipeline, the volumes that 
were previously pumped through the existing pipelines could dry up. This loss of transit 
revenue could potentially leave Ukraine with significant budgetary shortages. The result of 
this could be damaging for not only the maintenance of the energy sector infrastructure of 
Ukraine, but for the well-being of the society as well as the stability and legitimacy of 
Ukraine (Dusseult 2009: 32). The same is the case with regard to Moldova as it was 
above established that Moldova is an important transit route along which gas to the 
Romania, Bulgaria Turkey and the Balkans must pass. As the pipelines running through 
Moldova also passes Ukraine, a lowering of the volumes or a drying up of the pipelines 
towards Southern Europe in Ukraine will also have large economic consequences for 
Moldova. This is especially the case as it in section 5.2.2 was established that Moldova 
uses the revenues from the transit of gas to counterbalance the high price of gas that it 
has to pay Gazprom.  
 
The construction of competing pipelines also constitute a geopolitical challenge to Ukraine 
and Moldova as the dependence of Russia on the transit of gas through Ukraine and 
Moldova offers Ukraine and Moldova an important policy lever which can be used to 
counterbalance their strong dependence on Russian gas. If the construction of the 
competing pipelines leads to the drying up of the transit networks in Ukraine and Moldova, 
they will lose this policy lever. This constitutes a major geopolitical challenge to Ukraine 
and Moldova due to the loss of control of a policy lever which can be used strategically to 
ensure a reliable and payable access of gas supply from Russia. 
 
5.3 Sub-conclusion 
The energy security challenges of Ukraine and Moldova are first of all related to 
dependencies of imports of Russian gas of both countries. This is an economic energy 
security challenge to Ukraine and Moldova as transition of gas prices towards 
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internationally competitive levels constitutes major economic challenges to both due to the 
risk of energy price shocks. The dependency is further a geopolitical challenge for Ukraine 
and Moldova as Russia uses the dependencies for political purposes. The gas disputes of 
2006 and 2009 between Ukraine and Russia as well as the increasing of the price on gas 
for Moldova are examples of this. In the case of Moldova, the use of Russia of the conflict 
over Transnistria to take over a further stake of the Moldovan transit pipelines as well as 
having filed several suits against Moldovagaz are also examples of the geopolitical 
challenges the relationship with Russia on energy has to the gas energy security of 
Moldova. Beside the dependency on gas import from Russia, a main gas energy security 
challenge of Ukraine and Moldova regard the low levels of energy efficiency with regard to 
the production of gas. Lastly, the construction of additional pipelines constitutes a major 
energy security challenge first of all for Ukraine as the main gas transporter. As a 
consequence of the new offshore pipeline, the volumes that were previously pumped 
through the existing pipelines could dry up and the loss of transit revenue could potentially 
leave Ukraine with significant budgetary shortages. The constructions of additional 
pipelines are also important to the energy security of Moldova, should Gazprom decide to 
use the new transit routes instead of the transit routes through Ukraine into Moldova. As 
the revenues of the transit of gas are used by Moldova to counterbalance the high prices 
on gas for Moldova, this will also have large economic consequences for Moldova.  
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6. Analysis of preferences of the integration of Ukraine and Moldova  
 
In the former two chapters the geopolitical and economic challenges to the gas energy 
security of the EU on the one side and Ukraine and Moldova on the other have been 
established. In the following chapter these finding will be analysed and compared to each 
other with regard to establish the economic and geopolitical costs and benefits of 
cooperating on issues on gas within the framework of the Treaty with the use of the theory 
of liberal intergovernmentalism.  In order to decide on the explanatory power of the theory, 
alternative theoretical as well as empirical explanations will also be included. With this, the 
second research question of the study on how the national preferences for gas 
cooperation within the framework of the Treaty for the EU and Ukraine and Moldova can 
be explained is answered.  
 
The adaptation costs of cooperating within the framework of a supranational institution 
and more specifically within the framework of the Energy Community are in liberal 
intergovernmentalist terms below first introduced. This provides the framework for the 
following analysis and leads to the analysis of first the economic and then the geopolitical 
costs and benefits of the EU and Ukraine and Moldova of cooperation on energy within 
the framework of the Treaty.  
 
6.1 Preferences of supranational cooperation  
The aim of following chapter is to analyse the degree to which the interdependence of the 
trade of gas between the EU and Ukraine and Moldova has introduced incentives for 
multilateral cooperation within the framework of the Treaty as a mean to enhance national 
gas energy security of the EU and Ukraine and Moldova. In order to analyse this, it is first 
of all necessary to establish the institutional differences between the Treaty and the 
already in place bilateral agreements between the EU and Ukraine and Moldova and 
Ukraine.  
 
Starting with the Treaty, this commits the signatories to adopt and implement 14 acts of 
EU secondary legislation related to energy, the environment and competition (Prange-
Gstöhl 2009: 5299). The objectives of the Treaty are to create a stable legal and market 
framework capable of attracting investment in order to ensure a stable and continuous 
energy supply to the EU. Moreover, the Treaty envisages creating a single regulatory 
space for trade in network energy, to enhance security of supply in this space and develop 
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cross-border relations and lastly to improve energy efficiency and the environmental 
situation related to network energy and develop network energy market competition 
(Council 2006/500 EC: Article 1-7). With regard to gas this specifically means liberalizing 
the gas market by the adoption the European Community Directive 2003/55/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for 
the internal market in natural gas (Council 2006/500 EC: Annex 1). Moreover, the Treaty 
forms a secretariat which among other things is responsible of reviewing the proper 
implementation of the obligations under the Treaty and adopt procedural acts (Council 
2006/500 EC: Article 67).  
 
In contrast, the institutional structure of the already in place bilateral agreements between 
the EU and Ukraine and Moldova is an institutional apparatus in the form of an association 
council, a supporting committee and technical subcommittees for the different chapters of 
the agreements. Multilateral activity is highly decentralized and is in the first form steered 
by intergovernmental conferences. Unlike the Energy Community, there is no secretariat 
to sustain the process between these intergovernmental conferences, no treaty foundation 
and no legal code. Instead the agreements operate on the basis of declarations of intent 
to cooperate, statements of agreed priorities and actions plans for legislative and 
regulatory approximation and convergence with EU policy objectives. Moreover, 
compliance mechanisms are weak and action plan commitments are too broad to serve 
the benchmarks against which to evaluate implementation. The EU has attempted to 
make financial assistance conditional on progress towards implementing on the agreed 
policy objectives, but due to the problems of evaluation assistance it is only loosely tied to 
implementation (Padgett 2009: 1078-1079). The bilateral agreements in place between 
the EU and Ukraine are a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, an Action Plan and a 
Memorandum of Understanding on Energy. With regard to gas it is in the Action Plan and 
in the Memorandum of Understanding on Energy established how the Ukrainian gas 
sector is to gradually converge towards the principles of the internal EU gas market. Both 
agreements meanwhile stop short of incorporating specific parts of the energy acquis of 
the EU (EU-Ukraine Action Plan 2005 and EU-Ukraine Memorandum of Understanding 
2005). The bilateral agreements in place between the EU and Moldova are a Partnership 
Agreement and an Action Plan. As was the case with Ukraine, the Moldovan gas market 
is established to gradual converge towards the principles of the internal EU gas market, 
but the agreements stop short of incorporating specific parts of the energy acquis of the 
EU (EU-Moldova Action Plan 2005). 
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On this background, it is evident that signing the Treaty entails more adaptation costs for 
Ukraine and Moldova than the signing of already in place bilateral agreements. The high 
adaptation costs related to signing the Treaty compared to the relatively low obligations of 
the bilateral agreements means that the benefits of cooperating on gas with the EU for 
Ukraine and Moldova within the framework of the Energy Community has to succeed the 
benefits of cooperating on gas within the frameworks of the bilateral agreements. The 
main difference between the Treaty and bilateral agreements with regard to gas concerns 
the obligation of adopting the European Community Directive 2003/55/EC as a way to 
liberalize the gas markets in Ukraine and Moldova as well as the establishment of a 
secretariat to review the process of implementing of the obligations by the partner 
countries. On this background, the main focus of the following chapter is on the precise 
nature and relative weight of geopolitical and economic motivations with regard to the 
formation of preferences concerning the liberalization of the gas market in Ukraine and 
Moldova and the creation of multilateral institutions as part of the framework of the Treaty.  
 
6.2 Economic costs and benefits of energy cooperation 
Below are the economic benefits of cooperating on energy within the framework of the 
Treaty analysed with regard to the ability of the Treaty to resolve the economic challenges 
of gas energy security for the EU and Ukraine and Moldova. Specifically, the benefits with 
regard to attract investments, to avoid price shocks, gas transit games, the economic 
consequences related to the construction of new pipelines are analysed using the theory 
of liberal intergovernmentalism. Additional costs are lastly established.  
 
6.2.1 Cooperation as a mean to attract investments and avoid price shocks 
According to liberal intergovernmentalism cooperating within the framework of a 
supranational treaty needs to remove economic policy externalities as governments 
according to Moravcsik have an incentive to cooperate where policy coordination 
eliminate negative policy externalities and with this increase their control over domestic 
policy outcomes, confer section 3.3.2. Therefore, economic policy coordination has 
according to Moravcsik two major purposes, each of which aims at removing a negative 
policy externality. The first purpose is the accommodation of economic interdependence 
through reciprocal market liberalization as liberalization of the movement of goods, 
services and factors of production according to Moravcsik may promote modernization 
and a more efficient allocation of domestic resources, favouring producers in 
internationally competitive sectors and owners of internationally scarce factors of 
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production. The second major purpose is policy harmonization in order to assure the 
continued provision of public goods for which the state is domestically responsible. This 
includes socio-economic equality, macroeconomic stability and regulatory protection, 
confer section 3.2. 
 
With regard to the liberalization of the energy markets in Ukraine and Moldova, this can 
according to Heiko Prange-Gstöhl be expected to lower risks, improve the policy 
framework of the countries, make them more stable as well as increase trade due to the 
establishment of common rules. As a consequence of this the likelihood of investment is 
raised as evidence shows that this was the case for the new EU members in the East 
(Prange-Gstöhl 2009: 5301). Recalling that the likelihood of investment being raised is an 
important economic priority for Ukraine and Moldova in order for the countries to develop 
and modernize their gas sectors (confer section 5.2.1) policy coordination within the 
Treaty for Ukraine and Moldova falls within the first purpose of policy coordination of 
Moravcsik. Thus, though the outdated gas systems are not directly a result of the 
interdependence related to the structure of the trade of gas, the cooperation on gas within 
the framework of the Treaty allows Ukraine and Moldova to modernize their gas sectors of 
which can be found to raise their preferences for policy coordination.   
 
With regard to the second major purpose of policy coordination of liberal 
intergovernmentalism, the harmonization of the gas markets in Ukraine and Moldova with 
the internal gas market of the EU have important economic benefits for Ukraine and 
Moldova. The reason is that the dependence on Gazprom as the main exporter of gas to 
Ukraine and Moldova constitute a large economic security challenge to Ukraine and 
Moldova as their dependency on gas imports from Russia gives Russia leverage to raise 
the price of gas without any warning or consideration to the economic situations in 
Ukraine or Moldova. A transition of gas prices towards internationally competitive levels 
constitutes major economic challenges to both countries due to the risk of energy price 
shocks, confer section 5.2.1. Meanwhile, the economic challenges of price shocks can be 
mitigated by the liberalizing of the energy market as this will induce productivity together 
with profit-maximise the use of natural gas reserves. As liberalization of the energy market 
is at the centre of the policy coordination of the Treaty, Ukraine and Moldova can by 
joining the Energy Community mitigate the negative consequences of energy price shocks 
(German Institute 2007: 10) and thus eliminate this negative policy externality stemming 
from the dependence on Russia. At the same time, a competitive energy sector can serve 
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as a backbone for sustainable future economic growth and development (German Institute 
2007: 10). As macroeconomic stability is listed as part of the second major purpose of 
policy coordination of liberal intergovernmentalism, the harmonization of the gas markets 
of Ukraine and Moldova furthermore increases the preferences of policy cooperation 
within the framework of the Treaty for Ukraine and Moldova.  
 
6.2.2 Cooperation as a mean to avoid gas transit games 
The two main purposes of policy coordination of Moravcsik take both point of departure in 
the claim that economic interdependence creates negative policy externalities. These 
arise where the policy of one government create costs and benefits for another 
government, confer section 3.2.2. Applying this claim of Moravcsik to the interdependence 
of the trade of gas between Russia, the EU and Ukraine and Moldova, it is necessary to 
extend the argument of the theory as Moravcsik has not taken into consideration that 
policies between two or more governments may not only create externalities for one 
another, but also for a third party. This is the case for the EU with regard to the trade of 
gas as although the EU was not a strategic actor in the gas transit games between 
Ukraine and Russia in 2006 and in 2009, the EU was the party facing the highest 
economic costs of the conflicts due to the lack of reserves among its member states, 
confer section 4.1.2.   
 
In the light of this and with the argument extended, the harmonization of the internal gas 
market of the EU with the gas markets in Ukraine and Moldova can be explained by the 
theory as to contribute towards the transit dimension of EU energy security by means of 
ensuring that sufficient interconnection capacity is built in the EU to connect the EU to its 
hitherto poorly connected regional markets. The reason is that this will reduce the 
potential adverse impact of external transit interruptions (Yafimava 2011: 24) as 
liberalization of the energy markets in Ukraine and Moldova will improve the transparency 
and infrastructure of the Ukrainian and Moldovan gas sector as well as enabling the EU to 
more closely monitor the gas trade between Russia and Moldova. By reducing the 
economic consequences of the external transit interruptions, the EU assures the 
macroeconomic stability of its member states. This falls under the second purpose of 
policy coordination of Moravcsik and can therefore be considered to increase the 
preferences of policy coordination for the EU.  
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The improvement of the transparency and infrastructure of the gas market in Ukraine is 
also beneficial for Ukraine as it will allow Ukraine to avoid groundless acquisitions from 
Gazprom of illegal appropriation of transiting gas. Moreover, the harmonization of the gas 
market in Ukraine with the internal EU gas market in Ukraine will provide Ukraine 
assistance in the event of supplies interruption (Razdorozhny 2010).  
 
6.2.3 Cooperation and the construction of new transit pipelines 
It was in the section above established that the liberal intergovernmentalist claim that 
where the policies of two or more governments create negative externalities for one 
another interdependence creates an unambiguous incentive to coordinate policy, in the 
case of the trade of gas need to be extended to also include third parties, when these also 
experience negative externalities. This is also the case with regard to the negative policy 
externalities related to the construction of new transit pipelines. For both Ukraine and 
Moldova, the construction of new transit pipelines constitute an economic as well as 
geopolitical energy security challenge as the construction of such may have large 
economic consequences in the sense that it means less revenues from transit tariffs as 
well as lead to a loss of control of the policy lever of the transit pipelines, confer section 
5.2.3.  
 
Applying the extension of the purposes of policy coordination by Moravcsik, the 
construction of new transit pipelines can be perceived as a negative policy externality for 
Ukraine and Moldova. The negative policy externality stems from the interdependence of 
the pipeline gas trade and specifically, the agreement of building the new pipelines 
between Russia and the relevant European countries. As was the case with the use of the 
Treaty for the EU to coordinate policies to avoid externalities related to the gas conflicts in 
which the EU was not involved, Moldova and Ukraine may use the Treaty to coordinate 
policies in order to avoid negative policy externalities related to the construction of new 
gas pipelines in which Ukraine and Moldova are not involved. Specifically, integration into 
the Energy Community may be perceived as a safeguard against the construction of new 
transit pipelines as it in the preamble of the Treaty is established that the Treaty 
envisages an integrated market in natural gas and electricity, based on common interests 
and solidarity, among the parties subject to the Treaty (European Commission 2006/500 
EC: Preamble). If considering the construction of new gas pipelines not to be in the 
interest of Ukraine and Moldova and at the same time not solidary as it will have large 
economic and geopolitical consequence for Ukraine and Moldova, the Ukrainian and 
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Moldovan authorities may as members of the Energy Community use the Treaty to 
challenge the construction of new pipelines.  
  
With regard to the specific economic challenges related to the construction of competing 
pipelines, these were established in section 5.2.3 to be of vital importance as the 
construction of new pipelines potentially could leave Ukraine with significant budgetary 
shortages as well as reduce the ability of Moldova to counterbalance the high price of gas 
that it has to pay Gazprom. In the light of this, the economic benefits of policy coordination 
within the framework of the Treaty with regard to improving the macroeconomic stability of 
the countries, attract foreign investments as well as to increase trade, confer section 
6.2.1, will be found to be even more important for Ukraine and Moldova, and raises the 
likelihood of policy coordination.  
 
When turning to the policy cooperation for the EU as a mean to eliminate negative 
externalities with regard to the construction of new gas pipelines, this is not attractive in 
the same way as for Ukraine and Moldova. The reason is that the most recent gas crisis 
between Ukraine and Russia in 2009 seriously damaged both the reputation of Russia as 
an energy supplier as well as the reputation of Ukraine as an energy transit country. As a 
result of the crisis, the efforts of the EU to diversify away from Russian gas suppliers is 
expected to intensify, whilst the Nord Stream and South Stream projects is expected to 
gain further political support in the EU (Vahrta 2009: 159). This being the case prior to the 
integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community, the preferences of the EU 
on cooperating with Ukraine and Moldova on energy within the framework of the Treaty 
must be expected to decrease as the role of Ukraine and Moldova as transit countries will 
decrease with the construction of new transit routes which bypass the countries. The 
negative policy externality of interruptions in supply because of gas transit games 
between Russia and Ukraine and Moldova thus disappears by the diminishing of the role 
of Ukraine and Moldova as transit countries. As a consequence, the economic benefits of 
cooperating with Ukraine and Moldova in order to avoid these kinds of negative 
externalities also disappear.   
 
6.2.4 Economic costs of adopting the Treaty 
In the sections above it has been concluded that the integration of Ukraine and Moldova 
into the Energy Community is beneficial for both the EU and Ukraine and Moldova as this 
is in accordance with the two main purposes of policy coordination of Moravcsik. 
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Meanwhile, though this study focuses on cooperation within the framework of the Treaty 
with regard to gas, it is nevertheless necessary to take other economic aspects into 
consideration in order to fully understanding the economic benefits and costs of policy 
coordination within the framework of the Treaty. In this regard, an important aspect to 
consider regards that the Treaty does not impose any obligations on the EU, but does on 
Ukraine and Moldova. Especially the adoption of the environmental energy acquis can be 
found to entail high adaptation costs due to the obligation of adopting 11 environmental 
directives compared to one directive with regard to gas and two directives with regard to 
renewable energies and electricity. With regard to competition article 81, 82 and 87 of the 
EU Treaty form part of the Treaty requiring the participating countries to follow EU law 
(Prange-Gstöhl 2009: 5299-5301). On the other hand, the integration of Ukraine and 
Moldova imply additional financial assistance from the EU to Ukraine and Moldova in 
order for the countries to carry out the obligations of the Treaty as the EU finance the 
majority of the budget of the Energy Community (Council 2006/500 EC: Article 6). For 
example, of the budget for 2011 the EU financed 98 per cent (COM 2011/105 final). 
Therefore, whilst the integration of Ukraine and Moldova do not impose any costly 
obligations to the EU, it instead leaves the EU to finance the liberalization of the energy 
markets of Ukraine and Moldova. Meanwhile, as the secretariat is responsible for the 
reviewing of the proper implementation of the obligations under the Treaty by the parties 
of the Treaty, in the event of an infringement of the obligations imposed by the Treaty, the 
secretariat may impose sanctions. Such sanctions include the withdrawal of financial or 
technical assistance (Council 2006/500 EC: Article 83).  
 
Though integration into the Treaty with regard to gas therefore is economically beneficial 
for Ukraine and Moldova in the sense that it meets the economic purposes of policy 
coordination of Moravcsik, the high additional costs of cooperating on gas within the 
Treaty can be found to reduce the preferences of cooperating within the Treaty for the EU 
and Ukraine and Moldova. With regard to the EU, the ability of the EU of withdrawing the 
financial or technical assistance as well as the lack of additional obligations in the 
integration of Ukraine and Moldova will however be concluded as not to change the 
preferences of the EU on cooperating on gas within the framework of the Treaty for 
Ukraine and Moldova.  
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6.3 Geopolitical costs and benefits of energy cooperation 
Below are the geopolitical interests of Ukraine and Moldova on cooperating on gas within 
the framework of the Treaty analysed with regard to impact of the use of Russia of its 
political power in the area of gas over Ukraine and Moldova. Specifically, the impact of the 
construction of Russia of additional pipelines is first analysed and hereafter the use of the 
political power of Russia over Moldova with regard to the conflict over Transnistria. Lastly 
the geopolitical interests of the EU are analysed. The difference between a liberal and a 
realist account of the influence of Russia is included and used to discuss the explanatory 
power of the theory to account for geopolitical explanations for policy coordination in the 
area of gas for the EU and Ukraine and Moldova.  
 
6.3.1 The geopolitics of competing pipelines 
The gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 are indicators of the 
complicated relationship between Ukraine and Russia. For Russia, the gas crises have 
led to further investments in transit avoidance infrastructure, meaning that Russia believes 
that the present value of the future energy transaction flows is higher in the case of transit 
avoidances such as the construction of the Nord Stream and South Stream, confer 
section 5.2.1. Because of the severe economic negative policy externalities related to the 
construction of the new pipelines, the preferences of cooperating on gas within the 
framework of the Treaty was for Ukraine and Moldova analysed as to increase in that the 
economic benefits of the cooperation in general would increase in importance as well as 
due to the possibility that the Treaty could act as a safeguard against the construction of 
the pipelines, confer section 6.2.3  
 
Taking all of the above into consideration, cooperation on gas within the framework of the 
Treaty can be based on the geopolitical motivation of balancing the power of Russia as a 
way for Ukraine and Moldova to ensure that their positions as gas transit routes are not 
challenged by the construction of additional transit routes. This argument is in line with the 
liberal intergovernmental geopolitical explanation for national preferences formation 
concerning energy cooperation as established in section 3.3.4. Here it was argued that 
the preference formation concerning energy cooperation lies in the linkage between 
energy policies and the geopolitical goals related to the competition for, the control of as 
well as the securing of reliable access to the supply of gas. As the construction of 
additional pipelines is a competition to the role of especially Ukraine as a transit country, 
but also Moldova though to a smaller degree, Ukraine and Moldova can be expected to 
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cooperate on energy within the framework of the Treaty. An additional consideration 
regards that the construction of the competing pipelines not only will lead to the drying up 
of the transit networks in Ukraine and Moldova, but also lead to the loss of Ukraine and 
Moldova of their former lever on the transaction between Russia and Europe. This 
constitutes a major geopolitical challenge to Ukraine and Moldova due to the loss of 
control of a policy lever which was established could be used strategically to ensure a 
reliable and payable access of gas supply from Russia, confer section 5.3.2. 
 
In total, the costs of the construction of the new pipelines can be found to raise the 
preferences of energy cooperation within the framework of the Treaty for Ukraine and 
Moldova as way for Ukraine and Moldova to balance the power of Russia. Meanwhile, in 
terms of liberal intergovernmentalism this needs to be understood only with regard to 
ideological, institutional and material preferences and not as realists on the configuration 
of power. However, as maintaining influence over Ukraine according to Alexander 
Bogomolov & Oleksandr Lytvynnenko is more an existential imperative than a foreign 
policy priority of Russia (2012: 1) an alternative explanation to the integration of Ukraine 
into the Energy Community may be that Ukraine not only intends to ensure material 
preferences, but also intends to break the configuration of power of Russia. Indeed, 
according to the scholars Russia uses the Orthodox Church, the mass media, informal 
and formal business networks and non-governmental organizations as well as mobilizing 
constituencies around political sensitive issues to influence Ukraine and build a pole of 
attraction for Ukraine (Bogomolov & Lytvynnenko 2012: 1). On this background, the 
integration into the Energy Community may be used geopolitically by Ukraine in order to 
break the configuration of power of Russia and ensure more independence. As with 
regard to the EU the foreign policy of Russia may also impact the preferences of the EU 
with regard to cooperate on gas with Ukraine and Moldova also a way to balance the 
configuration of power of Russia. This is further analysed in section 6.3.3.  
 
6.3.2 The geopolitics of the relationship between Moldova and Russia 
With regard to the relationship on gas between Moldova and Russia, the Treaty was 
above found to be in the interests of Moldova due to the possibility of the Treaty acting as 
a safeguard against the construction of competing pipelines of Russia as well as reduce 
the risks related to the dependency of Moldova on gas imports from Russia. However, 
with regard to the conflict over Transnistria and the economic consequences of this with 
regard to energy, the Treaty is not in the geopolitical interests of Moldova as the Treaty 
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does not offer any solution to the conflict over Transnistria and herein the energy related 
issues and economic costs of the conflict for Moldova. The economic implications with 
regard to gas was in section 5.1.2 introduced to be related to the large gas debts of 
Transnistria as these according to Gazprom is to be paid by Moldovagaz as well as 
related to the legal status of the region is important in order for Transnistria to repay its 
gas debts, confer section, confer section 5.1.2. However, the bilateral agreements 
between the EU and Moldova are more promising than the Treaty with regard to settling 
the conflict over Transnistria, as this in the bilateral Action Plan between EU and Moldova 
from 2005 is listed as a special priority. This includes that the EU is to step up its 
involvement in supporting the OSCE and mediators in the process, reinforce political 
dialogue between the EU and Moldova on the Transnistria conflict and in general entail 
effective cooperation between the EU and Moldova towards a settlement of the 
Transnistria conflict (EU- Moldova Action Plan 2005: 9). The lack of measures to settle the 
conflict in Transnistria will be found to reduce the preferences of Moldova of signing the 
Treaty.  
 
6.3.3 The geopolitics of market liberalization of the EU 
In the objectives of the Energy Community it is stated that the Treaty aims at creating a 
stable legal and market framework capable of attracting investment and develop cross-
border relations in order to ensure a stable and continuous energy supply to the EU, 
confer section 6.1. These objectives are all geopolitical of nature as they regard the 
control over and security of a reliable access to the supply of gas for the EU. Therefore, 
the main analytical question with regard to the geopolitical interests of the EU using the 
theory of liberal intergovernmentalism is whether the integration of Ukraine and Moldova 
create a stable and legal regulatory framework as well as develop cross-border relations. 
With regard to the cross-border relations, the extension of the internal market of the EU 
towards Ukraine and Moldova has been found to contribute towards the transit dimension 
of EU energy security by means of ensuring that sufficient interconnection capacity is 
built. This was found to reduce the potential adverse impact of external transit 
interruptions as liberalization of the energy markets in Ukraine and Moldova will improve 
the transparency and infrastructure of the Ukrainian and Moldovan gas sector as well as 
enabling the EU to more closely monitor the gas trade between Russia and Ukraine, 
confer section 6.2.2. This is of geopolitical importance as it increases the control of the EU 
over the supply of gas, and thus can be used to reduce the impact of the worsening 
relationship between Russia and Ukraine and Moldova. Therefore, the Treaty can be 
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found to be of geopolitical interest to the EU as good and predictable political and 
commercial relations between seller, buyer, and transit countries are necessary in order 
for the EU to ensure the reliable and efficient operation of the transportation networks or in 
other words the transit dimension of EU energy security.  
 
However, whilst the preferences on gas for the EU therefore confirms the theoretically 
derived explanation, it is important to remember that this according to liberal 
intergovernmentalism is based on preferences with regard to ideological, institutional and 
material preferences and not as realists on the configuration of power. Meanwhile, the 
foreign policy on Russia towards its own neighbourhood may also have impact on the 
preferences of the EU towards Ukraine and Moldova. This is according to Prange-Gstöhl 
the case and he emphasises that Russian politics aims at creating a circle of energy 
relations in its neighbourhood and hereby aims to compete with the EU approach as this 
could be understood as an intrusion in its own neighbourhood (2009: 5301). In the light of 
this, it is evident that the preferences of the EU on cooperating on gas with Ukraine and 
Moldova may be based on more than the ideological, institutional and material 
preferences related to the trade of gas, but also on the intention of balancing the 
configuration of power in Europe. Indeed, a strong Russia allied with Ukraine could give 
Moscow confidence and strengths in dealing with Europe whilst a Russia without Ukraine 
can be considered much weaker as this this would give Russia fewer possibilities of using 
energy as an instrument of foreign policy. 
 
6.4 Sub-conclusion 
Using the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism, the liberalizing of the energy markets in 
Ukraine and Moldova within the framework of the Treaty entails benefits for both the EU 
on the one side and Ukraine and Moldova on the other. This is the case due to both the 
economic and geopolitical gains of energy cooperation within the framework of the Treaty. 
In the case of the EU, the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community 
is beneficial as it improves the transparency and infrastructure of the Ukrainian and 
Moldovan gas sector as well as enabling the EU to more closely monitor the gas trade 
between Ukraine and Moldova and Russia. This is important for the EU in order to avoid 
gas conflicts such as the ones between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and in 2009. In the 
case of Moldova and Ukraine, joining the Energy Community is also beneficial in the 
sense that the liberalization of their energy markets is found to attract investments as well 
as reduce the risks of price shocks. For Ukraine, the Treaty furthermore allows Ukraine to 
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avoid groundless acquisitions from Gazprom of illegal appropriation of transiting gas and 
provides Ukraine assistance in the event of supplies interruption. Another important 
aspect is the fact that integration into the Energy Community may be perceived as 
safeguard against the construction of new transit pipelines, such as the South Stream 
which yet has to be constructed.  
 
Meanwhile, as the Energy Community do not provide Moldova with any help with regard 
to solving the conflict over Transnistria, the Treaty is not solely in the geopolitical interests 
of Moldova due to the conflict was found to lower the control of Moldova over the supply of 
gas. This is also the case for the EU as the construction of competing pipelines is found to 
reduce the interests of the EU of integrating Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy 
Community as the role of Ukraine and Moldova as gas transit countries are reduced by 
the competing pipelines. Moreover, in discussing the explanatory power of the theory it 
has been found that the integration may be more about balancing the configuration of 
power for the EU and Ukraine than ensuring material preferences. Moreover, signing the 
Treaty may entail high additional economic adaptation costs for Ukraine and Moldova, 
which may also impact the preferences of policy coordination of Ukraine and Moldova.  
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7. Interstate bargaining and implementation of obligations 
 
In the following chapter the negotiations, the implementation and challenges related to the 
signing of Ukraine and Moldova of the Treaty is introduced. First, the level of gas reform 
prior to the accession to the Energy Community of Ukraine and Moldova are first 
established. Following this, the negotiations upon accession, the process and the 
problems of the implementation of the obligations of the Treaty is established.  
 
7.1 Level of gas reforms prior to accession to the Energy Community 
A key point in time with regard to the reform of the gas sector for Ukraine is the adoption 
of the Memorandum of Understanding on Energy between the EU and Ukraine in 2005 
and the Energy Strategy to 2030 by the Cabinet of Ministers in Ukraine in 2006. The 
overriding objectives of the Energy Strategy were to ensure the energy security of Ukraine 
and the status of Ukraine as a significant transit country. In order to reach these objectives 
a set of policy measures is specified, which include adopting relevant EU laws and 
undertake price reform. The measures represent and entail a radical shift in the underlying 
principles governing the Ukrainian energy sector and herein the gas sector as they require 
a move from monopoly organization to more competitive structures (ESBS in Ukraine 
2011). Though being a significant step, the strategy lacks effective mechanisms for its 
implementation and any market-oriented competition strategy that would remove 
monopolies and enact transparent regulations in the energy sector (Umbach 2011: 95). 
Therefore, and due to lack of significant reforms, by the eve of Ukraine joining the Energy 
Community there were very few free market mechanisms in place (Lyubashenko 2012: 2).  
 
With regard to Moldova, a key point in time is the adoption of the National Security 
Concept in 2006 by the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova. The document reflects the 
general overview of the national and international security state of affair. Herein, the 
situation in the energy sector is listed as potentially having a serious impact over the 
economy security and over the future development of Moldova. In the light of this, 
liberalization of the energy industry market is highlighted as a special requirement of the 
strategy. It is noted that this implies joining a common European energy market and 
ensuring the supplies system (Moldova National Security Concept 2008: 3 and 19). On 
this background, the Parliament in Moldova in 2007 approved the Energy Strategy until 
2020 which specifically deals with the objectives, measures and activities of how to 
develop a more efficient, competitive and reliable national energy sector while ensuring 
56 
 
the energy security of Moldova as well as the integration into the European energy market 
(Implementation of Moldova Energy Security Strategy 2009: 4).  
 
7.2 Negotiations upon accession to the Energy Community  
The first round of negotiations upon accession to the Energy Community for Moldova and 
Ukraine was held on 25 and 26 November 2008. Following the meeting, the Commission 
issued a declaration stating that Ukraine and Moldova had presented their initial 
assessments and timetables for the implementation of the Treaty. The meeting allowed for 
a comprehensive review of the requirements to be met and was according to the 
Commission very constructive and did not reveal any major obstacles to a swift 
negotiating process. Accordingly, the negotiations confirmed the desire of the EU to 
progress quickly and to conclude negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova possibly in 2009 
(Commission IP/08/1783). Hereafter, two further negotiations rounds followed. The 
technical negotiations with Moldova and Ukraine on full membership were concluded in 
2009 and as a result, the Ministerial Council of the Energy Community approved the 
accession of Ukraine and Moldova to the Energy Community in December 2009. 
However, the signature of the Accession Protocols was made dependent on the adoption 
of a gas law in compliance with the relevant EU rules. Following the adoption of new gas 
and electricity laws on 23 December 2009 (Moldova and the Energy Community 2011) 
Moldova signed the Accession Protocol in March 2010 and became a de jure full member 
of the Energy Community as of 1 May 2010 (Energy Community 2012: Milestones).  
 
In the case of Ukraine, it took rather long for the Ukrainian authorities to meet the demand 
of adopting a law liberalising the Ukrainian gas market. The law was adopted on 8 July 
2010 albeit in a different version than the one that had been adopted with the participation 
of the wider expert community and which furthermore could confirm the relevant type of 
EU legislation. Instead of being an effective mechanism for regulation, the value of the law 
was significantly reduced to a mere implementation of the accession requirements 
(Chubyk 2011). In addition, Ukraine had to fulfil an additional demand for accession. This 
demand required Ukraine to carry out a set of measures on strengthening safety of 
Ukraine nuclear power plants in accordance with IAEA requirements. The condition was 
fulfilled in February 2010 when the Ukrainian authorities finalized the implementation of 
the common EU-IAEA-Ukraine project on safety evaluation of the nuclear power plants in 
Ukraine (Razdorozhny 2010).  
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On 24 September 2010 the Protocol of Ukraine’s accession to the Energy Community 
Treaty was signed. The protocol was ratified by the Ukrainian parliament on 15 December 
2010 and signed by the President of Ukraine on 31 December 2010. As of 1 February 
2011 Ukraine became a de jure full member of the Community. At the same time, the 
countdown began to the time period defined in the implementation package for reforming 
the Ukrainian energy sector (Chubyk 2011).  
 
7.3 Process of implementing the obligations of the Treaty 
By joining the Energy Community Ukraine and Moldova committed themselves to adopt 
and implement the series of EU directives related to gas, electricity, renewable energy 
and environmental protection (Kononczuk & Matuszak 2012). According to Article 1 of the 
Accession Protocols of Ukraine Moldova, the countries are subject to all obligations 
imposed by the Treaty and by all Decision and Procedural Acts adopted in application of 
the Treaty since its entry into force. Article 2 identifies the relevant sections of the energy 
acquis in the field of gas and electricity markets, environmental and renewables, which 
Ukraine and Moldova have taken on themselves to implement as members of the Energy 
Community. The Accession Protocols furthermore introduces a tight timetable for the 
implementation of these (Ukraine Accession Protocol 2011 and Moldova Accession 
Protocol 2010). The deadline for the implementation of the relevant legislation was for 
Moldova by the end of 2010 and beginning of 2012 for Ukraine. Although the deadline for 
both countries has passed, it is only Moldova who has made some progress whilst 
Ukraine has failed to fully meet a single one of its obligations. This is introduced below.  
 
In the Annual Progress Report on the Implementation of the Acquis under the Treaty 
Establishing the Energy Community, the accession of Ukraine to the Energy Community is 
listed as of utmost importance for the gas sector on the whole. Accordingly, it substantially 
increased the size of the Energy Community natural gas markets, on account of the gas 
consumption levels of Ukraine, its gas infrastructure and the significant role the country 
plays with regard to trans-border flows (Energy Community Annual Report 2011: 23). 
However, despite of this, the process of Ukraine fulfilling its obligations as member of the 
Energy Community has been complicated and slow. This is especially the case with 
regard to the liberalization of its gas market. Though the overall framework in the gas 
sector since 2010 has been consistent with the energy acquis of the Energy Community, 
further improvement is needed (Kononczuk & Matuszak 2012). Thus, whilst the state of 
adaptation of the legislation of Ukraine to European regulatory acts in the gas sector is 
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satisfactory and that the Law on Ukraine On the Basis for the Operation of a Natural Gas 
Marker was effectively modelled on the basic principles of the two gas directives and the 
EU Regulation, the implementation of the necessary reforms are not satisfactory 
(Gazizullin & Lozovyy 2011: 7). The progress of the liberalization of the gas market can 
mainly be achieved through adoption of a set of secondary legislation in order to facilitate 
the obligations of the Treaty. However, by the end of 2011, the Ukrainian authorities had 
not introduced any legislation changing the existing rules of the games of the internal gas 
market (Kononczuk & Matuszak 2012).  At the same time, the EU has not started any 
programme supporting the modernization of the gas transit system in Ukraine. This 
remains conditional on the progress in gas market liberalization. The lack of the EU in this 
regard together with the lack of Ukraine to fully adopt the necessary legislation, have 
dominated the dialogue between the Energy Community and Ukraine, causing mutual 
disappointment (Lyubashenko 2012: 5-12).  
 
Moreover, the process of implementing the energy acquis with regard to gas of Ukraine 
has been further complicated by dissatisfaction with the South Stream project. In a letter 
sent by Ukrainian Energy and Coal Industry Minister Yuriy Boiko to the director of the 
secretariat of the Energy Community Slavtcho Neyko, the dissatisfaction of Ukraine in 
regard to the member countries of the EU and the Energy Community continuing 
promotion of the South Stream as pipeline project is highlighted (Interfax 2012). In the 
letter Boiko states that:  
 
“Despite Ukraine’s desire to create the necessary conditions to ensure Europe’s energy 
security, unfortunately, today we have seen that actions by the EU and the Energy 
Community are aimed at promoting the South Stream project and actively agreeing its 
parameters” (Interfax 2012).  
 
The actions Boiko are pointing to are the coordination by Slovenia and Gazprom on 27 
February 2012 on the parameters of the South Stream pipeline across the country. 
According to the independent newspaper Interfax, which obtained the letter, the minister 
in the letter states that the main purpose for Ukraine during its accession to the Treaty 
establishing the Energy Community was the creation of a unified energy market in 
compliance with rules of functioning that meet EU legislative requirements. In this context, 
the minister expresses that Ukraine would like to see concrete actions from the Energy 
Community aimed at protecting the interests of full member states (Interfax 2012).  
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Albeit the relevant reforms in Moldova were complicated by a prolonged political crisis 
associated with the inability of the Moldovan parliament to elect a president together with 
the ineffectiveness of the Moldovan government, Moldova has nevertheless made much 
more progress in implementing the energy acquis than Ukraine (Kononczuk & Matuszak 
2012). In the Annual Report on the Implementation of the Acquis under the Treaty 
establishing the Energy Community from 2010, it is stated that Moldova as the youngest 
contracting party provides an encouraging starting picture. It is highlighted that even 
though Moldova benefits from the implementation deadlines that are different from those 
applicable to other contracting parties, Moldova has already almost fully implemented 
several directives and regulations by primary legislation (Energy Community Annual 
Report 2010: 16). The development was followed up in the 2011 assessment. Among 
other things the Energy Community here notes that in order to further the progress made 
in primary legislation, the Moldovan institutions signed an Implementation Partnership with 
the Energy Community Secretariat in June 2011, outlining the cooperation aimed to 
advance the implementation of enforcement and development of secondary legislation. In 
the report, the continuing progress of adopting the primary legislation of Moldova is noted 
(Energy Community Annual Report 2011: 112).  
  
7.3.1 Problems of implementing the Third Package 
In order to improve the market conditions of the internal market of the EU the European 
Community on 6 October 2011 approved the so called Third Package. The package 
intends to improve the market conditions, in particular the access of new electricity and 
gas producers and suppliers. This is to be achieved by separating the transmission 
activities from the production and supply activities, thus ensuring access to transmission 
services for any company that intends to enter the internal electricity or gas market with 
production or supply-activities. The separation should occur not only in terms of operation 
and legal issues, but also in terms of company ownership in the sense that a company 
that owns an electricity or gas transmission network will not be able to own any production 
or supply companies. The implementation of the Third Package is to take place from the 
year of 2015 (Surugiu 2012: 5).  
 
The signing of the Third Package has proven to entail a range of costs for Ukraine and 
Moldova, especially with regard to their relationship with Russia. In the case of Moldova, 
negotiations for a new contract, among other things deciding the price on gas and the 
transit of gas between Gazprom and Moldogaz has reached a deadlock after Moldova 
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signed the obligation of implementing the Third Package. The reason is that by Moldova 
implementing the Third Package this would mean radical changes to the role of 
Moldovagaz and thus implicitly Gazprom, forcing the company the requirements according 
to which room should be provided for other potential players (Surugiu 2012: 13). In the 
case of Ukraine, the signing and later implementation of the Third Package could 
deteriorate the relations with Russia further, as the country sees the package as a threat 
to its own interest. Indeed, one of the main conditions Russia is stipulating if Ukraine 
wants to revise its contract is to merge Gazprom and Naftogaz. On the other hand, 
Ukraine wants the price of imported gas to be cut nearly in half and the gas transit 
volumes to be guaranteed. Moreover, a number of Russian analysts also say that the 
Third Package could put long-term contracts with EU member states in jeopardy, making 
long-term energy supply and transit contracts impossible (Gazizullin & Lozovyy 2011: 1-
4).  
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8. Analysis of the bargaining and implementation of the obligations 
 
The aim of the following chapter is to decide on how the bargaining and implementation of 
the obligations of the Treaty has been shaped, hereunder the main interests at stake and 
the balance of common gains. This will shed light on the precise nature of the 
cooperation, which preferences have been the most conducive and how the 
implementation of the obligations of the Treaty has taken place. In order to decide on the 
explanatory power of the theory alternative theoretical and empirical explanations will 
again be included. All together it allows for the answering of the third guiding question 
regarding how the national preferences have affected the interstate bargaining and 
implementations of the obligations of the Treaty, the fourth guiding questions regarding 
the main challenges of the integration process and lastly also the fifth and last guiding 
question regarding to what degree the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy 
Community ensure the transit dimension of EU energy security.  
 
In the following the preferences of gas cooperation within the framework of the Treaty for 
the EU and Ukraine and Moldova will first be compared to each other using the terms of 
the theory of international bargaining. Hereafter is the bargaining and implementation of 
the commitments related to signing the Treaty for Ukraine and hereafter Moldova 
analysed. Due to the lack of fulfilling of its membership obligations, the lack of reform of 
Ukraine is also analysed. Lastly, the implications of the adoption of the Third Package are 
analysed.  
 
8.1 International bargaining and preferences of energy cooperation  
Using the theoretical framework to analyse the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the 
Energy Community the theory has to explain how the intergovernmental bargaining and 
implementation of the obligations of the Treaty is shaped. Of particular analytical 
importance is the extent to which state preferences are compatible or conflictual, the 
balance of common gains and distributional trade-offs between states. Thus, the 
fundamental concept is asymmetrical independence, meaning that countries expecting to 
get large benefits have the most intense preferences for an agreement and are disposed 
to make concessions in order to reach it, because it would still make them better-off than 
status quo. By contrast, countries for which agreement is less important are likely to see 
their priorities get through, because they can credibly threaten not to ratify any agreement 
far from their preferences, confer section 3.4.  In the light of this and in order to analyse 
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the evolution of the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community, one 
needs to analyse the convergence of the preferences of the EU and Ukraine and 
Moldova.  
 
Starting with the geopolitical interests of the EU and Ukraine and Moldova, the policy 
cooperation within the framework of the Energy Community was in section 6.1.2 found to 
be beneficial for the EU as well as for Ukraine and Moldova because of the geopolitical 
nature of the pipeline trade of gas. Therefore, the liberalization of the energy markets in 
Ukraine and Moldova was found to enhance the energy security of all as it eliminated the 
negative policy externalities stemming from the geopolitical character of the trade of gas. 
Meanwhile, it was also found that the market liberalization and supranational cooperation 
on energy within the Treaty does not solve the challenges to the energy security of 
Moldova that stem from the conflict over Transnistria. This was found to reduce the 
geopolitical interests of Moldova of cooperating on gas within the Treaty, confer section 
6.3.2. The construction of additional gas pipelines was furthermore found to reduce the 
interests of the EU of integrating Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community as the 
importance of Ukraine and Moldova as transit countries are being reduced by the new 
pipelines bypassing both countries, confer section 6.2.3. Moreover, the analysis has 
highlighted that the geopolitical and economic preferences for the EU on the one side and 
Ukraine and Moldova on the other are different. Whilst the interest of the EU was found to 
be based on avoiding the economic costs related to gas transit games (confer section 
6.2.2) the interests of Ukraine and Moldova was among other things found to be based on 
the fact that the Treaty may be used as a safeguard against the construction of the South 
Stream as well as to attract investments in order to modernize their gas systems, confer 
section 6.2.1 and 6.2.3  
 
Additionally, in negotiating policy coordination the bargaining leverage will according to 
Moravcsik favour those governments who are able to remove negative externalities by 
opening markets to which others intensely desire access, modifying policies others 
intensely desire to change, or distributing resources others intensely desire to share. The 
more intensely governments desire agreements, the more concessions and the greater 
efforts they will spend to achieve it, confer section 3.4. Applying this argument of 
Moravcsik to the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community, the roles 
of Ukraine and Moldova as gas transit countries are important. By Ukraine opening its 
energy markets the EU will gain access to the most important gas transit network of which 
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the negative policy externalities of gas transit games first and foremost stem from. By 
Moldova opening its energy markets the EU will also gain access to an important transit 
network, but which is much less important to the transit dimension of EU energy security, 
because of the volumes pumped through Moldova are much less than is the case in 
Ukraine. On the other hand, the members of the Energy Community will also open their 
gas networks to Ukraine and Moldova. Due to the Treaty envisaging an integrated market 
in natural gas based on common interests and solidarity among the parties subject to the 
Treaty, the opening of the gas markets of the members of the Energy Community may be 
used strategically by Ukraine and Moldova to challenge the construction of competing 
pipelines, confer section 6.1. As the construction of competing pipelines will have the 
worst economic costs for Ukraine, due to Ukraine being the most important transit country 
in which the majority of gas is transited trough, this interest in the Energy Community will 
be considered being most intense for Ukraine.  
 
Another aspect to take into consideration regards that the Treaty in section 6.2.4 was 
found not to impose any costly obligations on the EU, but on Ukraine and Moldova. This is 
especially the case with regard to the adoption of the environmental energy acquis. On 
the other hand, the integration of Ukraine and Moldova was also found to imply additional 
financial assistance from the EU to Ukraine and Moldova. Nevertheless, in the event of an 
infringement of the obligations imposed by the Treaty, the EU may withdrawal the financial 
or technical assistance.   
 
Taking all of above into consideration it becomes evident that the integration of Ukraine 
and Moldova into the Energy Community entails asymmetrical costs and benefits for the 
EU and Ukraine and Moldova. Moreover, for all parties the integration entails both costs 
and benefits. Recalling from the theory (confer section 3.2) that severe distributional 
issues may be difficult to handle within the context of multilateral institutions, because they 
involve the pursuit of particular interests which conflict with the generalized principles of 
conduct on which multilateral institutions are based, the asymmetry in the preferences can 
be found to reduce the interest of the EU and Ukraine and Moldova of integrating Ukraine 
and Moldova into the Treaty. When there exist a mix of benefits and opportunities policy 
cooperation may according to Moravcsik instead be better adjusted by bilateral 
agreements, confer section 3.2. As liberal intergovernmentalism does not offer any 
instrument on how to measure costs and benefits to one other as well as does not offer 
any explanation on why countries may decide to cooperate despite asymmetrical benefits,  
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the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community cannot be explained 
using the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism as despite the asymmetries in 
preferences, Ukraine and Moldova have nevertheless been integrated into the Energy 
Community. In order to decide this, it is instead necessary to turn to the empirical data of 
the bargaining and implementation of the obligations of the Treaty as well as to discuss 
alternative theoretical and empirical explanations.   
 
8.2 The bargaining and implementation of obligations of the Treaty 
The economic and geopolitical preferences of cooperating on gas within the framework of 
the Treaty was above analysed with the use of the terms of the theory of international 
bargaining in order to establish whether the EU or Ukraine and Moldova have had the 
most intense preferences for energy cooperation. Due to the asymmetries in preferences 
as well as the Treaty entailing both costs and benefits for the EU and Ukraine and 
Moldova it could however not be concluded whether the Treaty was most in the interest of 
the EU or Ukraine and Moldova. In the light of this, the implementation of the demands of 
accession to the Treaty and the ultimately signing of the Treaty of Ukraine and Moldova 
will in the following be analysed with the aim of establish for which party the Treaty has 
been most in the interests of. This is of importance in order to establish the level of 
integration as well as to what degree the integration of Ukraine and Moldova ensure the 
transit dimension of EU energy security and is possible as the fulfilling of the obligations of 
the accession requirements and the process of implementing the obligations of the Treaty 
will shed light on the interests of the EU and Ukraine and Moldova.  
 
Below is first the implementation and bargaining of the Treaty for Ukraine and the EU and 
hereafter Moldova and the EU analysed.  
 
8.2.1 Accession and implementation of the obligations of Ukraine  
It was above established that the integration of Ukraine into the Energy Community could 
not be concluded to be either most in the interests of Ukraine nor the EU and it was 
therefore not clear which party should be expected to make concessions in order to 
integrate Ukraine into the Energy Community. Turning to the empirical data of the 
implementation of the demands of accession to the Energy Community these was in 
section 7.3 established to take longer for Ukraine than was the case for Moldova. This 
was specifically the case with regard to gas as it took long for Ukraine to meet the 
demand of adopting a law liberalizing the Ukrainian gas market. When the law finally was 
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adopted it was in a much different version than the anticipated with the value of the law 
being significantly reduced to be a mere implementation of the accession requirements 
instead of an effective mechanism for regulation as a result. The lack of sufficient reform 
of the gas sector in Ukraine is not new for Ukraine and has characterized the gas sector in 
Ukraine for years, confer section 7.1.  
 
Notwithstanding the lack of sufficient reform, Ukraine was nevertheless integrated into the 
Energy Community without further demands from the EU. When recalling from the theory 
that the more intensely governments desire agreements, the more they will be ready to 
make concessions in order to reach it, the acceptance of the EU of the lack of sufficient 
gas reform in Ukraine indicates that the Treaty was more in the interest of the EU than 
Ukraine. The reason for liberal intergovernmentalism not fully being able to explain this 
concession of the EU may not only related to the integration entailing both costs and 
benefits for the EU of which the theory do not offer any instruments on how to compare 
these to each other, but also that the integration of Ukraine may not only based on 
domestic material preferences. An alternative explanation is that the integration is a result 
of the intention of the EU of ensuring that Ukraine is not deepening its relations with 
Russia further, confer section 6.3.3. Indeed, a strong Russia allied with Ukraine could give 
Moscow confidence and strengths in dealing with Europe whilst a Russia without Ukraine 
can be considered much weaker as this this would give Russia fewer possibilities of using 
energy as an instrument of foreign policy. Recalling the introduction to liberal 
intergovernmentalism this explanation is more in accordance with the realist school of 
international relations than the liberal school due to where liberals attribute the sources of 
security threats to domestic conflicts about ideological, institutional and material 
preferences, realists attribute them to particular configuration of power, confer section 3.1. 
Additionally, as cooperation within the framework of the Treaty not only regard 
cooperation on gas, but also includes other energy sources such as electricity and oil, an 
alternative explanation is that in order for liberal intergovernmentalism to explain the 
integration of Ukraine and Moldova one needs to include more than one component of the 
cooperation.  
 
Turning to the implementation of the obligations of the Treaty, Ukraine had by the end of 
2011 not introduced any legislation changing the existing rules of the games of the 
internal gas market whilst was criticising the construction of the South Stream. At the 
same time, the EU had not started any programmes supporting the modernization of the 
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gas transit system in Ukraine as this was made conditional on the progress in gas market 
liberalization, confer section 7.2.1. With regard to the lack of implementation of the 
obligations this cannot solely be explained by the Treaty being most in the interests of the 
EU as the liberalization of the gas market in Ukraine also has been found to entail a range 
of benefits for Ukraine. The integration will therefore be considered as to should have lead 
Ukraine to progress further than was the case. The reason for the theory not being 
capable of explaining the lack of progress may however here not related to alternative 
explanations as was the case above, but instead to the focus of the theory on the 
negotiations and not the implementation of obligations. As the theory in this study is 
extended to account for the implementation of the obligations as well the theory comes to 
a halt as it cannot explain these in the case that these have changed as according to 
Kononczuk and Matuszak have been the case for Ukraine. According to the scholars, the 
dispute over the South Stream and over the lack of additional funding, in which the EU 
has made funding conditional on the progress on the gas market liberalization, has made 
it clear to the Ukrainian government that its hopes with regard to the benefits of joining the 
Treaty has been misguided. As a consequence the Ukrainian government has started 
questioning the wisdom of its membership of the Energy Community (Kononczuk & 
Matuszak 2012). This argument will here be considered a likely explanation to the lack of 
implementation of the obligations of the Treaty as the construction of competing pipelines 
as well as the economic benefits regarding the modernization of the gas network system 
in Ukraine was found to be among the main geopolitical and economic preferences of 
Ukraine with regard to joining the Treaty. In the light of this, the interests of Ukraine of 
fulfilling its obligations have been reduced when it was discovered that the Treaty does 
not fulfil these benefits.  
 
The lack of implementation of the obligations of membership of the Energy Community of 
Ukraine provides the EU with a large challenge as the transit dimension of EU energy 
security has been established as to depend on the liberalization of the energy market in 
Ukraine. The reason is that this will increase the transparency and the infrastructure of the 
gas sector in Ukraine as well as allow the EU to more closely monitor the gas trade 
between Ukraine and Russia. The lack of implementation stems from the asymmetry of 
interests as well as the change in the benefits of membership for Ukraine.  
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8.2.2 Accession and implementation of obligations of Moldova 
The integration of Moldova into the Energy Community has not been possible to explain 
as being most in the interests of the EU or Moldova when using the theory of liberal 
intergovernmentalism. The reason is that the interest of the EU of integrating Moldova 
was expected to be reduced due to the construction of competing pipelines. The interests 
of Moldova was also found to be reduced due to the lack of the Treaty of finding a solution 
to the conflict over Transnistria and with this the challenges to the energy security of 
Moldova stemming from the conflict as well as the high adaptation costs related to the 
integration. As a consequence it was not possible to decide whether Moldova or the EU 
would make the most concessions in regard to the integration. Meanwhile, when looking 
at the level of implementation of the demands for accession for Moldova, the adoption of 
the relevant reforms went much more smoothly for Moldova than was the case for 
Ukraine. This process has continued to the implementation of the obligations of the 
Treaty, making the Energy Community to highlight Moldova as an encouraging starting 
picture, confer section 7.2. On this background, it is evident that integration into the 
Energy Community is clearly in the interest of Moldova. This is also reflected in the 
National Security Concept of 2006 where the Parliament of Moldova stress that joining a 
common European energy market is listed a special priority, confer section 7.2. As 
stressed above, the theory was not capable of explaining this due to the asymmetry of 
interests as well as the theory does not offer any instruments on how to compare costs 
and benefits to one another. However, there may also be another explanation as countries 
that would like to become members of the EU according to Frank Schimmelfennig may 
behave as if they were subject to accession conditionality and therefore adopt EU rules to 
signal their readiness to join, and seek to persuade the EU to consider them as 
candidates (Schimmelfennig 2010: 14). As Moldova has made joining the EU a main 
priority, the adoption of the relevant reforms may in this view not only be a result of the 
economic and geopolitical benefits of joining the Energy Community exceeds the costs, 
but because Moldova behaves as if it was subject to accession conditionality in order to 
signal its readiness to join the EU. This explanation shares the assumption of the 
rationality of states with the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism as Moldova simply 
does what it mean is necessary to become an EU member state. Meanwhile, 
constructivism may also provide an alternative explanation as integration with the EU may 
also be based on socialization and the diffusion of ideas and discourses about good policy 
and best practises (Radaelli 2003: 41). In this view, the rapid implementation of the 
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obligations of the Treaty by Moldova may be a result of socialization with the EU rather 
than rational assumptions of how to become an EU member state.  
 
8.3 The implementation of the Third Package 
The implementation of the Third Package has proven to be a challenge for Ukraine and 
Moldova due to the package is not in the interest of Russia. The reason is that the 
implementing of the Third Package will significantly impede the objective of Russia of 
taking over the gas sector in Ukraine, due to the many directives and regulations 
separating the transmission activities from the production and supply activities, thus 
ensuring access to transmission services for any company that intends to enter the 
internal electricity or gas market with production or supply-activities. In Moldova, Gazprom 
is highly interested in maintaining the status quo due to its control over Moldovagaz. Due 
to the implications of the Third Package, Gazprom has therefore linked the extension of its 
contract to Moldova giving up its gas sector obligations arising from membership of the 
Energy Community due to the implementation of these would mean a significant 
weakening of the position of Gazprom in Moldova (Kononczuk & Matuszak 2012). 
Therefore, at present an essential factor deciding the implementation of the obligations of 
Moldova and Ukraine as members of the Energy Community is the pressure from Russia, 
which is trying to block the integration with the EU in the energy sector. With regard to 
Ukraine, it cannot according to Kononczuk & Matuszak be ruled out that the Ukrainian 
authorities will not resist giving up membership in the Energy Community for a reduction in 
the price of Russian gas. On the other hand, if Moldova meets all the commitments, this 
would expose the country to a series of dispute with Russia, due to the high dependence 
on imports from Gazprom in the gas sector (Kononczuk & Matuszak 2012).  
 
Leaving the alternative explanations of the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the 
Energy Community aside, the decision of Russia to make the conclusion of new gas 
agreements dependent on the lack of implementation of the Third Package represent in 
liberal intergovernmentalist terms another cost to the membership of the Energy 
Community for Ukraine and Moldova. Whether it will lead either country to give up 
membership is still to be seen and may also depend on other variables than economy and 
geopolitics as analysed above, but it can by using the theory indeed be considered a 
possibility as the disagreement with Russia over the Third Package reduces the control of 
Ukraine and Moldova over the import of gas and the tariff for the transit of gas. Recalling 
from the theory that national governments only have an incentive to cooperate where 
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policy coordination increases their control over domestic policy outcomes, permitting them 
to achieve goals that would not otherwise be possibly, membership of the Energy 
Community can be found to reduce the control over the import of gas and the tariff for gas 
transit for Ukraine and Moldova. In the light of this the disagreement with Russia 
constitutes a main challenge to the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy 
Community.  
 
In addition to the disagreement with Russia over the Third Package the asymmetry in the 
preferences of cooperation on gas within the framework of the Treaty was in section 8.1 
also found to constitute a main challenge to the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into 
the Energy Community.  As it in section 6.2.1 was established that the integration of 
Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community do not in itself ensure the transit 
dimension of EU energy security, these challenges to the integration of Ukraine and 
Moldova are important as they reduce the transit dimension of EU energy security. The 
reason is that the challenges may be understood as have caused Ukraine not to fully 
implement its obligations of the Treaty and may lead both Ukraine and Moldova to give up 
membership. In the light of this, the Treaty cannot be found to ensure the transit 
dimension of EU energy security fully. This is the case even though alternative 
explanations for the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community may 
exist and therefore also alternative explanations to whether Ukraine and Moldova may be 
at risk of leaving the Energy Community.  
 
8.4 Sub-conclusion 
Using the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism to the integration of Ukraine and Moldova 
into the Energy Community it is evident that the integration entails asymmetrical costs and 
benefits for the EU and Ukraine and Moldova. Moreover, for all parties the integration 
entails both costs and benefits. In such a situation policy cooperation may according to 
the theory instead be better adjusted by bilateral agreements, which gives the theory of 
Moravcsik difficulties in explaining the integration. This is the case as the theory does not 
offer any explanation on why states may decide to cooperate even in the case of 
asymmetrical preferences or offer any instruments on how to compare costs and benefits 
of membership of the Energy Community to one another. Therefore, with the use of the 
theory of liberal intergovernmentalism the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the 
Energy Community cannot be concluded to be a result of the Treaty being most in the 
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interests of the EU or Ukraine and Moldova and it has instead been necessary to include 
alternative explanations.  
 
Nevertheless, despite the lack of explanation of the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism 
of the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community, the theory has 
been able to highlight important asymmetries in the preferences of cooperation on gas 
within the framework of the Treaty. According to the theory, these asymmetries reduce the 
economic and geopolitical interests of both the EU and Ukraine and Moldova on 
cooperating on gas within the framework of a supranational institution like the Energy 
Community. In addition to this, the use of the theory has highlighted the risk of Ukraine 
and Moldova giving up their membership of the Energy Community due to the 
disagreement with Russia over the Third Package. With regard to the later this is the case 
as membership of the Energy Community in the light of the disagreement with Russia has 
been found be reduce the control over the import of gas and the tariff for gas transit for 
Ukraine and Moldova. These findings are of great importance even though there may 
exists alternative explanations for the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy 
Community and therefore also alternative explanations to whether Ukraine and Moldova 
may be at risk of leaving the Energy Community as the transit dimension of EU energy 
security was found to depend on increasing the transparency and infrastructure of the 
Ukrainian and Moldovan gas sector as well as on the ability of the EU to more closely 
monitor the gas trade between Ukraine and Moldova and Russia. Therefore, with the use 
of the theory it can concluded that the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy 
Community do not ensure the transit dimension of EU energy security.  
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9. Conclusion 
  
The integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community cannot be solely 
explained using the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism as the integration has been 
found to entail asymmetrical costs and benefits for the EU and Ukraine and Moldova as 
well as entailing both costs and benefits for all parties. When there exist a mix of benefits 
and opportunities one should according to liberal intergovernmentalism expect bilateral 
bargaining and not the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community. 
On this background, it has been necessary to implement alternative explanations for the 
integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community such as the interests of 
the EU of balancing the power of Russia, the intensions of membership of Moldova and 
the change of preferences of Ukraine.  
 
Despite this, the use of liberal intergovernmentalism has led to several important findings. 
Together these have established that the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the 
Energy Community does not ensure the transit dimension of EU energy security. This 
conclusion is made possible as the use of liberal intergovernmentalism has highlighted 
that the structure of the trade of gas is characterized by a relationship of interdependence 
between Russia, the EU and Ukraine and Moldova. This is the case as Russia is the main 
supplier of gas to the EU and the gas that reaches the EU travels through Ukraine and 
Moldova. This interlocks Russia, the EU and Ukraine and Moldova into a long term 
relationship of high interdependence. The interdependence has large economic 
consequences for the EU as it means that gas transit games such as the gas crises 
between Ukraine and Russia in 2006 and 2009 also affect the EU. Indeed, with the use of 
the theory it has become clear that the EU is the party facing the highest economic costs 
in case of such conflicts due to the lack of reserves among its member states. 
 
On this background, the transit dimension of EU energy security was found to depend on 
increasing the transparency and infrastructure of the Ukrainian and Moldovan gas sectors 
as well as on the ability of the EU to more closely monitor the gas trade between Ukraine 
and Russia. As the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community ensure 
this, the integration and implementation of the obligations of the Treaty of Ukraine and 
Moldova was found to be essential for the transit dimension of EU energy security. 
Therefore, despite the lack of explanation of the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism of 
whether the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community is a result of 
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the Treaty being most in the interest of the EU or Ukraine and Moldova, the use of the 
theory makes it possible to answer whether the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into 
the Energy Community ensure the transit dimension of EU energy security. This is not the 
case as the lack of implementation of the obligations of Ukraine can be explained by the 
asymmetries in the preferences of cooperation on gas within the framework of the Treaty. 
The reason is that according to the theory this reduces the economic and geopolitical 
interests of Ukraine of implementing the obligations of the Treaty. In addition to this, the 
use of the theory has highlighted the risk of Ukraine and Moldova giving up their 
membership of the Energy Community due to the disagreement with Russia over the 
Third Package. With regard to the later this is the case as membership of the Energy 
Community in the light of the disagreement with Russia has been found be reduce the 
control over the import of gas and the tariff for gas transit for Ukraine and Moldova. 
Therefore, as the transit dimension of EU energy security was found to depend on 
increasing the transparency and infrastructure of the Ukrainian and Moldovan gas sector 
as well as on the ability of the EU to more closely monitor the gas trade between Ukraine 
and Moldova and Russia, with the use of liberal intergovernmentalism it can be concluded 
that the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community do not ensure the 
transit dimension of EU energy security.  
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10. Perspectives 
 
The use of liberal intergovernmentalism as a theoretical framework has not been capable 
of fully explaining the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community and 
alternative explanations have therefore been included and shortly reflected upon. In the 
following, the lack of explanation of the theory together with the general critique of the 
theory will be discussed. Below is the critique discussed first in terms of the theoretical 
critique and hereafter the empirical critique.  
 
Theoretically, liberal intergovernmentalism has in the study been criticized for not being 
able of explaining why countries may decide to cooperate within supranational institutions 
when preferences are asymmetrical as well as being criticized for not offering any 
explanations on how a change in preferences may change the bargaining and 
implementation of demands. With regard to the former, it has been suggested that the 
integration of Ukraine into the Energy Community is a result of the intention of the EU of 
weaken Russia as a lack of alliance between Russia and Ukraine on gas would give 
Russia fewer possibilities of using energy as an instrument of foreign policy. This 
argument is more in line with the realist school of international relations than the liberal 
school. This does however not mean that liberal intergovernmentalism is not suitable for 
the analysis of the integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community, but 
instead that rather than keeping the two schools separate, one need to absorb the realist 
paradigm to broaden and strengthen the explanatory power of liberal 
intergovernmentalism. Specifically, it could be interesting to supplement the theory of 
Moravcsik with for example the theory of cooperate hegemony of Thomas Pedersen as 
this theory is set out to explain regional integration. Stressing the importance of grand 
strategies of major regional powers and their responses to the balance of threat in a 
region, the theory states that major powers may advance their interests through non-
coercive means by applying strategies of cooperate hegemony (Pedersen 2002: 677). 
Thus, the theory of cooperate hegemony may be used to explain the interest of the EU of 
integrating Ukraine and Moldova as a mean to balance the hegemony of Russia. With 
regard to the critique of liberal intergovernmentalism regarding the lack of explanation on 
the effect of a change in preferences, this critique resembles the critique lead forward by 
proponents of supranational or historical institutionalism. According to these scholars, 
liberal intergovernmentalism is well suited to account for the initial grand bargaining and 
the original choice of institutions, however in subsequent round of negotiations the 
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preferences of the governments may change and will be constrained by unanticipated or 
undesired consequences of their previous decisions (Schimmelfennig 2004: 82). On this 
background it would have been interesting to incorporate supranational or historical 
institutionalism to the analysis of the implementation of the obligations of the Treaty of 
Ukraine and Moldova. This would provide information on the reasons to why Ukraine has 
changed preferences and to what degree Ukraine will be constrained by previous 
decisions as to decide on whether the change of preferences constitute a real risk of 
Ukraine giving up its membership of the Energy Community.  
 
In addition to the theoretical critique of liberal intergovernmentalism, it has in the study 
also been suggested that the lack of explanation of the integration of Ukraine and 
Moldova may also be a result of the empirical unit of the analysis. Taking this into 
consideration, the economic and geopolitical variables may not offer a full picture of the 
preferences of the EU and Ukraine and Moldova on cooperating on gas within the 
framework of the Energy Community. Especially, as both Ukraine and Moldova have 
shown interests in becoming EU member states, it may be reasonable to assume that 
energy cooperation within the framework of the Energy Community may also be a picture 
of the desire of joining the EU or be a consequence of other variables such as European 
identity or socialization with the EU. The later variables suggest that one may analyse the 
integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community using a constructivist 
methodology instead of a rational methodology as is the case with the use of liberal 
intergovernmentalism.  Another empirical critique regards the narrow focus on gas 
cooperation within the framework of the Treaty. Whilst cooperation on gas has shown to 
be an important component of the Treaty it is important to remember that the cooperation 
also regards other energy sources such as electricity and oil. As both Ukraine and 
Moldova produce electricity (Kononczuk & Matuszak 2012 and Moldova 2012: 41) the 
integration into the Energy Community may not only reflect preferences with regard to 
gas, but also reflect preferences on extending the markets for their production of electricity 
to EU member states.  
 
In sum, in order to increase the explanatory power of liberal intergovernmentalism of the 
integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community it would be relevant to 
absorb other theoretical schools as well as increasing the empirical data collection. 
  
75 
 
11. Bibliography  
 
11.1 Reports and papers 
 Belkin, Paul & Morelli, Vince L. (2007): The European Union’s Energy Security 
Challenges, Congressional Research Service, United States  
 Belkin, Paul & Ratner, Michael & Nichol, Jim & Woehrel, Steven (2012): Europe’s 
Energy Security: Options and Challenges to Natural Gas Supply, Congressional 
Research Service, United States 
 Bogomolov, Alexander & Lytvynnenko, Oleksandr (2012): A Ghost in the Mirror: 
Russian Soft Power in Ukraine, The Aims and Means of Russian Influence Abroad 
Series, Chatham House, Briefing Paper 
 Borisocheva, Ksenia (2007):  Analysis of the Oil- and Gas-Pipeline-Links between EU 
and Russia: An account of intrinsic interests, Centre for Russia and Euroasia, Athens, 
Greece 
 Christie, Edward (2009): European Security of Gas – A New Way Forward in Liuhtu, 
Kari (eds): The EU-Russia gas connection: Pipes, Politics and Problems, Electronic 
Publications of Pan-European Institute 8/2009 
 David, Dusseault (2009) Europe’s triple by-pass- The prognosis for the Nord Stream, 
South Stream and Nabucco in Liuhtu, Kari (eds): The EU-Russia gas connection: 
Pipes, Politics and Problems, Electronic Publications of Pan-European Institute 8/2009  
 European Files (2011): The European Files: Security of Energy Supply in Europe – 
Continous Adoptation, Brussels   
 Gazizullin, Ildar & Lozovyy, Larion (2011): Ukraines Gas Market: The European Rules 
Against Russian Appetite, Policy Paper, International Centre for Policy Studies 
 German Institute (2007): Energy Price Shocks and Market Reforms: A quantitive 
Assesment, Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting in Ukraine, 
German Advisory Group in Economic Reform 
 Gnedina, Elena & Emerson, Michael (2009): The Case for a Gas Transit Consortium 
in Ukraine: A Cost Benefit Analysis, Centre for European Policy Studies, Policy Brief, 
No. 180  
 Implementation of Moldova Energy Strategy (2009): Implementation of Energy 
Strategy of Republic of Moldova till the year of 2020, The Institute of Energy 
Economics, Japan 
 Keppler, Jan Horst (2007): International relations and security of energy supply: Risks 
to continuity and geopolitical risks, Paper 
76 
 
 Lyubashenko, Igor (2012): Ukraine’s First Year in the Energy Community: Restart 
Needed, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, Policy Paper, No. 28 
 Montanari, Marco (2005): Knocking on EU’s door: The political economy of EU-
Ukraine relations, Paper 
 Moravcsik, Andrew (2010): Liberal theories of international relations: A Primer, 
Princeton University, Paper 
 Motyl, Alexander (2006): Ukraine vs. Russia, The Politics of an Energy Crisis, Open 
Democracy, Paper 
 Nies, Susanne (2008): Oil and Gas Delivery to Europe: An overview of Existing and 
Planned Infrastructures, European Governance and the Geopolitics of Energy, Institut 
Fransais Des Relations Internationales, Paris 
 Niewiem, Sylvia A (2008): The Nexus between ENP and European Energy Security in 
Petersson, Bo & Törnquist-Plewa, Barbara (ed): Energy Security in Europe: 
Proceedings from the conference “Energy Security in Europe”, Lund Universitet 
 Ratner, Michael & Belkin, Paul & Nichol, Jim & Woehrel, Steven (2012): Europe’s 
Energy Security: Options and Challenges to Natural Gas Supply Diversification, 
Congressional Research Service, United States  
 Schimmelfennig, Frank (2010): Europeanization beyond member states, Paper for the 
Staats- und Europawissenschaften 2010 
 Stern, Jonathan (2006): The Russian-Ukrainian Gas Crisis of January 2006, Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies, Paper 
 Stern, Jonathan & Pirani, Simon & Yafimava, Katja (2009): The Russo-Ukrainian Gas 
Dispute of January 2009: A Comprehensive Assessment, Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies 
 Stern, Jonathan (2006): The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of January 2006, Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies 
 Surugiu, Ruslan (2012): Third Energy Package and and its Impact on the Energy 
Sector in the Republic of Moldova, Expert Group, Centru Analitic Independent  
 Umbach, Frank (2011): Ukraine’s Energy Security Challenges: Implications for the EU 
in Kuzio, Taras & Hamilton, Daniel: Open Ukraine: Changing Course Towards a 
European Future, Center for Transatlantic Relations  
 Vahrta, Peeter (2009): Energy security in Europe in the Aftermath of 2009 Russia-
Ukraine gas crisis in Liuhtu, Kari (eds): The EU-Russia gas connection: Pipes, Politics 
and Problems, Electronic Publications of Pan-European Institute 8/2009 
77 
 
 Vahtra, Peeter (2009): Energy Security in Europe in the aftermath of 2009 Russia-
Ukraine Gas Crisis, PEI Electronic Publications 08/2009 
 World Bank Group (2010): The Future of the Natural Gas Market in Southeast Europe, 
Paper 
 
11.2 Journal articles  
 Borbica, Ana & Miclaus, Paul-Gabriel & Ungureanu, Stefan (2007): Energy Security – 
A Critical Issue in the European Energy Security, The Romanian Economic Journal, 
No. 25, pp. 49-76 
 Correlje, Aad & Linde, Coby Van Der (2006): Energy supply and geopolitics, A 
European Perspective, Energy Policy, No. 34, pp. 532-543 
 Dimitrova, Antoaneta & Dragneva, Rilka (2009): Constraining External Governance : 
Interdependence with Russia and the CIS as Limits to the EU’s Rule Transfer in 
Ukraine, Journal of European Pubic Policy, Vol. 16, no. 6, pp. 853-872 
 Ginsberg, Roy H. (1999): Conceptualizing the European Union as an International 
Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1 
 Gombos, Catalin & Mateescu, Dragos (2012): Moldova’s Political Self and the Energy 
Conundrum in the Context of the European Neighbourhood Policy, Central European 
Journal of International and Security Studies, No. 2, pp. 36-64 
 Hirschhausen, Christian von & Meinhart, Berit & Pavel, Ferdinand (2005): 
Transporting Russian Gas to Western Europe – A Simulation Analysis, The Energy 
Journal, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp 49-68  
 Kusku, Eda (2010): Enforceability of a common energy suppy security policy in the 
EU: An intergovernmentalist assessment,  Caucasian Review of International Affairs, 
Vol. 4, No. 2 
 Moravcsik, Andrew (1993): Preferences and Power in the European Community: A 
liberal intergovernmentalist approach, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, 
No. 4, pp. 473-524 
 Moravcsik, Andrew (1997): Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of 
International Politics, International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 513-553 
 Moschella, Manuela (2007): An International Political Economy Approach to the 
Neighbourhood Policy. The ENP from the Enlargement and the Mediterranean 
Perspectives, European Political Economy Review, No. 7, pp. 156-180 
78 
 
 Padgett, Stephen (2011): Energy cooperation in the Wider Europe: Institutionalizing 
Interdependence, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 49, No. 5, pp. 1065-1087  
 Pedersen, Thomas (2002): Comparative Hegemony: Power, Ideas and Institutions in 
Regional Integration, Review of International Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 677-696 
 Pollack, Mark (2001): International Relations Theory and European Integration, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 221-244 
 Prange-Gstohl, Heiko (2009): Enlarging the EUs internal energy market: Why would 
third countries accept EU rule export?, Energy Policy, Vol. 37, pp. 5296-5303 
 Tiongson, E.R & Baclajanschi, I. & Bouton, L. & Mori, H. & Ostojic, D. & Pushak T 
(2007): Rising Energy Prices in Moldova, Macroeconomic and Distribution Impact, 
Problems of Economic Transition, Vol. 49, No. 10, pp. 5-40  
 Yegorov, Yuri & Wirl, Franz (2009): Ukrainian Gas Transit Game, Zeitschrift für 
Energiewirtschaft, No. 2, pp. 147-155 
 
11.3 Books 
 Moravcsik, Andrew (1998): The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power 
From Messina to Maastricht, Cornwell University Press 
 Opitz, Petra & Hirschhausen, Christian von (2001): Ukraine as the Gas Bridge to 
Europe? Economics and Geopolitical Considerations in Hoffmann, Lutz & Möllers, 
Felicitas (eds): Ukraine on the Road to Europe, Physica-Verlag Heidelberg 
 Pirani, Simon (2009): Russian and CIS Gas Markets and Their Impact on Europe, 
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford University Press, New York 
 Radaelli, Claudio (2003): The Europeanization of Public Policy in Featherstone, Kevin 
& Radaelli, Claudio (eds): The Politics of Europeanization, Oxford University Press 
 Schimmelfennig, Frank (2004): Liberal intergovernmentalism in Wiener, Antje & Diez, 
Thomas, European Integration Theory, Oxford University Press 
 Stern, Jonathan (2005): The future of Russian Gas And Gazprom, Oxford Institute for 
Energy Studies, Oxford University Press, New York  
 Yafimava, Katja (2011): The Transit Dimension of EU Energy Security: Russian Gas 
Transit Across Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 
Oxford University Press, New York 
 Yin, Robert K (2003): Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Applied Social 
Research Methods Series, Sage Publications, London 
 
 
79 
 
11.4 Online articles 
 Blas, Javier (2012): Russia faces challenges to gas supremacy, Financial Times, 17 
April 2012 – entered 23. July 2012 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7099a0b6-886a-11e1-a526-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1zAwNqIxh 
 Chubyk, Andriey (2011): Ukraine and European Energy Community – entered 20. July 
2012 
http://www.easternpartnership.org/publication/politics/2011-04-12/ukraine-and-
european-energy-community  
 Kononczuk, Wojciech & Matuszak, Slawomir (2012): Ukraine & Moldova and the 
Energy Community – entered 25. July 2012 
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2012-03-28/ukraine-moldova-and-
energy-community  
 Razdorozhny, Yevgeniy (2010): Ukraine’s Accession to the Energy Community, New 
Opportunities and New Responsibility – entered 28. July 2012 
http://www.ier.com.ua/en/publications/comments/archive_2010/?pid=2440 
 
11.5 Official documents 
 Commission 2000/769 (2000): Green Paper: Towards a European strategy for the 
security of energy supply, European Commission  
 Commission IP/08/1783 (2008): Press Release: Commission Opens Negotiations with 
Ukraine and Moldova upon Accession to the Energy Community, European 
Commission  
 Commission 2009/977 final (2009): Commission staff working document: The January 
2009 gas supply disruption to the EU: An Assessment 
 Commission 2011/105 final (2011): Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council under Article 7 of Decision 2006/500/EC 
 Council 2006/500 EC (2006): Council Decision of 29 May 2006 on the conclusion by 
the European Community on the Energy Community, European Council 
 EU-Moldova Action Plan 2005 
 EU-Ukraine Action Plan 2005 
 EU-Ukraine Memorandum of Understanding on Energy 
 Energy Community Annual Report (2010): Annual Report on the Implementation of the 
Acquis under the Treaty Establishing the Energy Community, Energy Community 
Secretariat 
80 
 
 Energy Community Annual Report (2011): Annual Report on the Implementation of the 
Acquis under the Treaty Establishing the Energy Community, Energy Community 
Secretariat 
 EU Security Strategy 2003: A Secure Europe In A Better World, European Security 
Strategy 
 Moldova 2007 (2007): Energy Strategy of the Republic of Moldova until 2020 
 Moldova National Security Concept (2008): National Security Concept of the Republic 
of Moldova  
 Moldova Accession Protocol (2010): Protocol concerning the Accession of Ukraine to 
the Treaty Establishing the Energy Community, Energy Community 
 Moldova (2012): Moldova 2020: National Development Strategy: 7 Solutions for the 
Republic of Moldova 
 Ukraine Accession Protocol (2011): Protocol concerning the Accession of Ukraine to 
the Treaty Establishing the Energy Community, Energy Community 
 
11.6 Websites:  
 Energy Community Milestones (2012) – entered 23. July 2012 
http://www.energy-
community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME/ENERGY_COMMUNITY/Milestones 
 ESBS in Ukraine (2011): Ukraine’s Energy Strategy to 2030 – entered 15. July 2012 
http://www.esbs.kiev.ua/en/energy-sector-cooperation-and-reforms/ukraine-s-energy-
strategy-to-2030  
 Interfax (2012): Ukraine challenges in Energy Community the promotion of the South 
Stream project by members – entered 14. July 2012 
http://www.interfax.com.ua/eng/main/96362/ 
 Moldova and the Energy Community (2011): Moldova and the Energy Community: 
Conference results in the signing of the Implementation Partnership, Energy 
Community – entered 20. July 2012 
http://www.energy-
community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME/NEWS/News_Details?p_new_id=4741  
 Nord Stream Website (2012) – entered 18. July 2012  
http://www.nord-stream.com/pipeline/construction/ 
 South Stream Website (2012) – entered 18. July 2012  
http://south-stream.info/index.php?id=10&L=1 
 
